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There is now increased recognition that Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) can occur
after Traumatic Brain Injury (McMillan, 1996; Bryant & Harvey 1999). Recent literature
highlights the occurrence of traumatic incidents which, although accompanied by brain
injury, result in symptoms consistent with PTSD. Furthermore, this raises the question of
whether PTSD can occur after non-traumatic brain injury, for example, stroke (Sembi et al.
1998). Memory for the event appears to be important in the development of PTSD
symptoms particularly in relation to re-experiencing the event. The role of memory for the
event in the development of PTSD following acquired brain injury remains unclear
(Sbordone & Liter 1995).
Following on from work by Berry (1998), this study aimed to confirm whether it is possible
for PTSD to occur following both haemorrhagic and ischaemic stroke. The effect of loss of
consciousness on memory for the event, as well as the consequence of this on subsequent
psychological distress is explored. The implications of a stressor which disrupts brain
function is considered with particular emphasis on the frequency and type of symptoms
reported.
The thirty-two individuals who participated in this study had recently experienced either a
haemorrhagic or an ischaemic stroke. All participants were screened to exclude those who
had severe cognitive impairment. Participants completed self-report measures describing
current psychological distress including symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted to diagnose PTSD. Data was collected on type,
location and severity of stroke as well as demographic details. The results are discussed
with reference to previous research findings.
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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is usually associated with natural disasters,
deliberately caused disasters or accidents. However, more recent studies have started to
investigate the presence of this disorder following medical events. One particular area of
investigation which continues to be controversial is co-morbid post-traumatic stress disorder
and acquired brain injury. This thesis will review the existing research with particular
attention given to the role of memory and consciousness in development of PTSD and the
neurobiology of PTSD. This thesis will argue that PTSD is not incompatible with brain
injury. It will also describe the mechanisms which could explain development of PTSD in
brain injured individuals. The specific typology associated with post-traumatic reactions
which present with co-morbid brain injury will also be described.
As most of the research to date has involved traumatically brain injured participants, this
thesis aims to investigate whether post-traumatic stress disorder can occur following
cerebrovascular accident. The emphasis will be on whether consciousness and memory are
required for an individual to develop PTSD symptoms. A brief review of the literature on
lesion location and mood disorders will be considered as the study also aims to investigate
whether there is a link between lesion site and PTSD. Finally, the thesis aims to establish
whether the PTSD typology associated with traumatic brain injury is also representative of
the traumatic reaction following the experience of stroke.
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1:1 Post -traumatic Stress Disorder
1:1:1 Definition
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the diagnostic category applied to individuals who
develop particular psychological symptoms following a traumatic experience. The
American Psychiatric Association DSM IV criteria for diagnosis are given in Appendix 1.
The main diagnostic requirements are that the person has been exposed to an event which
involved actual or threatened, death or injury, and that their response was one of intense
fear, horror or helplessness. The symptoms of this disorder are grouped into three main
categories: the individual repeatedly relives the event in some way, they avoid cues which
remind them of the event and there is a numbing of their general emotional responsiveness
despite increased physiological arousal. The prevalence of PTSD is difficult to ascertain as
rates are influenced by the occurrence of disasters and they vary considerably depending on
the assessment measures used. While the generally accepted rate of PTSD lies between 5
and 15 per cent of the general adult population (Yule, 1999), an estimated 69 per cent of the
population are thought to be exposed to a traumatic event at some point during their lifetime
(Sbordone, 1999).
1:1:2 What constitutes a stressor?
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder became a diagnostic category of the 3rd edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders (DSM III) in 1980. To be diagnosed
as having PTSD under DSM III-R (1987) it was required that the individual had been
exposed to an event which could be considered 'outside the range of usual human
experience' (DSM III-R p 247). Since the original entry both the definition and the criteria
have evolved in response to epidemiological data which indicated that PTSD could occur in
response to events which were not infrequent. As Kilpatrick, Edmunds & Seymour (1992)
estimated that 13 per cent ofwomen have been sexually assaulted, it could be concluded that
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for women, sexual assault is not an event 'outside the range of usual experience'. Despite
this, almost half of reported rape cases result in PTSD (O'Shea, 2001). In DSM-IV (1994),
the definition of what constitutes a stressor was revised and there is now general consensus
on the types of experiences which are associated with the subsequent development of PTSD.
These include combat, rape, natural disasters or extreme deprivation. A recent
epidemiological survey reported by Andrews, Rocco, Lampe, Hunt & Page (1994) found the
most frequently occurring traumatic events which led to development of PTSD were; in
males, combat or violent incidents, and in women, rape and sexual molestation. This
revision meant the range of events which might constitute a trauma has been broadened.
1:1:3 PTSD and medical events
For a considerable time it had been recognised that a traumatic event, however it was
defined, was not sufficient to result in PTSD. Research studies had been emphasising the
role of individual differences in the development of PTSD. These included the event
specific features, for example, the cognitive appraisal of the event as well as factors which
predisposed the individual to develop PTSD in response to trauma. Brewin, Dalgleish &
Joseph (1996), described trauma as an event which challenges the assumptions that an
individual has about the world. This might include experiences which highlight personal
vulnerability, for example being attacked, or those which contribute to the inability to
achieve one's life goals. Research into PTSD began to highlight that events which were
considered part of normal life experience could, nevertheless, have catastrophic
significance. Definitions, including that by Brewin, were recognising the impact that major
illness, disability or loss of employment could have on an individual's assumptions about
the world. The consequences of these types of events began to be interpreted by some
within a trauma framework. One of the earliest of these studies was by Shalev, Schreiber,
Galai, & Melmed, (1993) who reported a series of case studies of PTSD in patients who had
3
undergone, what would be considered, routine medical procedures. These cases highlighted
that although the event is an important part of the trauma, the individual's appraisal as well
as the significance the event has for them, is crucial in the subsequent development of
PTSD. Shalev et al, (1993) described one patient who developed PTSD following diagnosis
of and treatment for a brain tumour. Despite making a good physical recovery with no
residual disability, the patient experienced distressing intrusive imageiy of being
permanently disabled, thus suggesting that re-experiencing is not always dependent on
memory of the event. O'Carroll, Masterton, Gooday, Cossar, Couston, & Hayes (1999)
interviewed a group of patients who had experienced variceal haemorrhages and were
surprised to find that only one patient in their sample of thirty, met diagnostic criteria for
PTSD. The experience of variceal haemorrhage could be considered highly traumatic and
this finding demonstrated that the event itself is not sufficient to result in PTSD. Research
into psychological reactions to physical illness and medical events has continued. Ballard,
Stanley, & Brockington (1995) described PTSD following childbirth, an event not 'outwith
usual experience', and Bennett & Brooke (1999) described a PTSD prevalence rate of 10 per
cent following myocardial infarction.
1:2 Acquired Brain Injury
1:2:1 What is acquired brain injury?
Acquired brain injury is the generic term applied to brain injuries which can occur as the
result of a number of different mechanisms. Common mechanisms associated with brain
injury include trauma, infection or vascular disruption. Brain injury which has been
acquired as the result of trauma is relatively common. King (1997b) claimed that the annual
incidence for hospital admission due to brain injury is between 250-300 per 100,000 of the
population. The majority of these, approximately 75 per cent, will be classified as mild
head injuries, with a Glasgow Coma Scale score on admission to hospital of between 13 and
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15, or a post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) of one hour or less. The mechanism of injury
provides information on the type of potential damage and the neuropsychological sequelae
likely to be reported. A traumatic brain injury (TBI) resulting from a road traffic accident or
a fall, tends to involve what is termed acceleration-deceleration injury. This means that as
the individual has either stopped suddenly or as their head has hit a stationary object, the
brain sustains a coup and contre-coup injury. This is the consequence of the sudden force
exerted, causing the brain to be thrown about inside the skull. A coup injury affects the area
below the site of impact while a contra-coupe injury describes lesions diametrically opposed
to the point of impact (Walsh & Darby, 1999). Injury is not confined to points of direct
impact. When the brain is shaken violently, as in acceleration-deceleration injury, the axons
stretch and shear to the point where the connections within the brain substance are disrupted
and damaged. Loss of consciousness can occur due to a number of reasons including brain
stem or midbrain damage and perhaps "brain shock" (Lezak, 1995). The most commonly
affected sites in acceleration-deceleration or concussional injuries are the frontal and the
anterior temporal areas. Secondary injuries including, for example, cerebral oedema are
potentially serious complications. As the brain is contained within the skull there is no
surplus space to accommodate the expansion associated with cerebral swelling. This can
lead to raised intracranial pressure, intracerebral haemorrhage and secondary damage
(Lezak, 1995). Brain injured patients who sustain concussional or diffuse injuries are likely
to experience neuropsychological and neurological sequelae referred to as post-concussional
syndrome (King, 1997b). This is one factor which complicates the issue of PTSD and brain
injury. In reviews of literature reporting dual diagnosis, some authors propose that what the
clinicians and researchers diagnose as PTSD is actually post-concussional syndrome (PCS)
(Hickling, Gillen, Blanchard, Buckley & Taylor 1998).
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The main features of PCS are described by Miller (1999) as:
• attention or concentration problems
• learning and memory difficulties
• concrete thinking
• psychomotor retardation
• mood disturbance including depression and anxiety
• increased irritability and agitation
• impulsive behaviour
• inertia or reduced motivation or initiation
It is clear that there is considerable symptom overlap between PCS and PTSD which will
make dual diagnosis extremely difficult. Post-concussional syndrome is believed to be
extremely common after brain injury. King (1997b) reports figures of 50 per cent in cases
following even mild and moderate traumatic brain injury and this might have led to
symptoms being attributed to PCS which might have represented a post-traumatic reaction.
The overlap with PCS was clearly illustrated by McMillan, (1991) who published a case
study of a severely brain injured patient who presented with symptoms consistent with post-
concussional syndrome. It was only following a more detailed investigation of the
symptoms that it became apparent to him the patient was also experiencing the defining
characteristics of PTSD, namely intrusive thoughts as well as both cognitive and physical
avoidance.
1:2:2 Could traumatic brain injury result in PTSD?
Investigations of psychological distress following road traffic accidents have been frequent
and some report PTSD prevalence rates as high as 39 per cent (Mayou, Bryant, & Duthie
1993; Blanchard, Hickling, Taylor & Loos 1995). Although relatively common, road traffic
accidents frequently expose those involved to risk of death or serious physical injury. As
the most common cause of traumatic brain injury is road traffic accident, it is reasonable to
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conclude that patients who have experienced a traumatic brain injury might also be at risk of
developing PTSD (Hickling et al 1998). Other common causes of traumatic or acquired
brain injury are assaults, falls or industrial accidents, all of which are events which are
sudden, could be life threatening and are often associated with helplessness or fear. The
DSM III-R includes car accidents amongst the types of event which might result in PTSD.
Furthermore, both the third and fourth revisions of DSM acknowledge the possibility of co-
morbid head injury:-
"sometimes there is a concomitant physical component of the trauma which may
involve direct damage to the central nervous system (e.g. malnutrition or head
injury) " (DMS III-R 1987 p 248).
"general medical conditions may occur as a consequence of the trauma (e.g. head
injury) " (DSM IV p 426).
Despite this, the issue of whether an event which has caused a brain injury could also result
in PTSD, remains contentious. However, it is not that brain injury per se is incompatible
with PTSD, but whether it is possible for someone to have PTSD if they have no memory of
the event. Some authors have even argued that the absence of memory resulting from brain
injury protects individuals from becoming traumatised by their experience. In 1943, Adler
(cited in O'Brien & Nutt 1998) first suggested that brain trauma might protect the individual
from developing the symptoms that we would recognise now as PTSD. She described
individuals who had been involved in the Coconut Grove Fire disaster in 1940's America
and reported better neuropsychiatric outcome for those patients who had lost consciousness
during the incident. O'Brien & Nutt (1998) described another of Adler's studies which
reported the same phenomenon in a different group of patients. She had observed that of
those with retrograde amnesia only a small number had subsequently developed any
psychogenic symptoms. The main reason why brain injury could be considered to protect
the individual from developing PTSD is if the brain shuts down then memory of the event
cannot be stored or encoded. In the discussion that follows the author intends to describe
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theory and research relating to both memory in general, and the neurobiology of fear and
trauma. This suggests that traumatic memory is acquired in such a way that it might not be
incompatible with brain injury.
1:2:3 Role ofmemory
Discussion of memory usually relates to memory which has been explicitly processed and
which has required an awareness of the environment. The information stored via this route
is then consciously accessible and would include autobiographical and semantic memories.
It has been concluded from a number of investigations of memory impairment that the
explicit memory system is within the domain of medial temporal area and the limbic system,
specifically the hippocampus (Krikorian & Layton 1998; Kolb & Wishaw 1990). As well as
the hippocampus being important in constructing explicit memory it also stores the temporal
features of the memory and makes connections to any other stored information which might
be relevant (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & Damasio 1995). Establishing
an explicit memory requires the individual to be conscious and would be disrupted by brain
injury. It is this which has led some authors, including Mayou et al (1993), to conclude that
only patients who have remained conscious during a traumatic event could develop memory
of it and therefore go on to develop symptoms associated with PTSD. Sbordone & Liter,
(1995) categorically state that traumatic brain injury and PTSD are 'mutually incompatible
and different disorders " (Sbordone & Liter, 1995, p411). Their evidence for this conclusion
comes from a study in which participants who were diagnosed with either mild TBI or
PTSD were assessed. In the course of the interviews the researchers were struck by the
contrasting reports given of the events and symptoms. All of the participants with PTSD
were able to recall their experiences in detail and they all reported having intrusions,
flashbacks and nightmares. In contrast, none of the participants with TBI were able to
describe the event or reported having any of the re-experiencing symptoms. As a result the
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authors concluded that none of the TBI group had PTSD. O'Brien & Nutt (1998) state that
as loss of consciousness leads to the absence ofmemory, patients:-
"will not have any horrific memories, flashbacks or nightmares and so will not re-
experience the incident repeatedly" (O'Brien & Nutt 1998, p 102).
Furthermore, it could be argued that the absence ofmemory for the event, means reminders
of the event do not evoke distress. The individual does not therefore feel the need to avoid
cues which are associated with the incident. It is not thought possible for re-experiencing or
avoidance to be among the psychological symptoms which could occur subsequent to TBI.
However, both O'Brien & Nutt (1998) and Sbordone & Liter (1995) appear to present the
view that PTSD has a specific symptom profile which will be the same for all patients and
furthermore that explicit processing is the only way that traumatic memory can be acquired.
In addition to the conscious processing of information, memory can also be processed
implicitly. This refers to the acquisition and storage of information which has not been
conscious and despite it being inaccessible it nevertheless influences our conscious
awareness (Bradshaw & Mattingley 1995). This type of processing is thought to store
primarily perceptual representations and because it is not related to conscious awareness,
there is no connection between these implicit aspects of memory and previous experience.
Bradshaw & Mattingley (1995) reported that this type of processing is mediated by the
cerebellum. It was one of the classic cases of neuropsychology reported by Scoville &
Milner (1953), that described an example of intact implicit processing despite impaired
explicit processing (cited in Walsh & Darby 1999). Their patient, HM, had a bilateral,
medial temporal lobe resection and subsequently lost his ability to explicitly learn new
information. However, he continued to demonstrate the ability to learn information
implicitly. This was the first of many neuropsychological studies to demonstrate that these
two memory processes are differentially affected by brain injury. During brain injury the
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system responsible for the explicit processing of information is disrupted and this will
clearly have an effect on how the event is encoded. However, implicit memory means that
despite the disruption to the explicit system, information can and does continue to be
encoded and stored (Bradshaw & Mattingley 1995), even if this occurs outwith our
conscious awareness.
Current cognitive models have taken this dual processing of information into account when
explaining development and symptoms of PTSD. Brewin (2001), suggested that when faced
with trauma, information is processed into a verbally accessible system (compatible with
explicit processing) and a situationally accessible system (compatible with implicit
processing). The verbally accessible system is capable of storing information which would
inhibit the fear response. Post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms develop as the verbally
accessible information, which usually competes with the situationally accessible system to
inhibit fear, is disrupted which means the information stored in the situationally accessible
system predominates. If this occurs, the fear response is repeatedly triggered by situational
cues which are not mediated by the verbally accessible system or influenced by conscious
awareness. The person might consciously 'know' that the event is not recurring but the
trigger at a perceptual or sensory level which activates their physiological reaction, does not
have access to this information. Brewin proposed that the PTSD symptoms facilitate the
transfer of information to the verbally accessible system where it can be fully processed.
1:3 Neurobiology of fear and PTSD
Not only does implicit processing have an important role in storing trauma memory in non-
brain injured but discussion of the neurobiology of fear and PTSD suggests that the
acquisition of trauma memory is not the same as normal memory and therefore might not be
disrupted by brain injury. The group of structures, which includes the hippocampus and the
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amygdala, known collectively as the limbic system is important in both memory and
emotional responding (Walsh & Darby 1999). When faced with a threat, sensory
information is projected from the thalamus to the amygdala where it is then appraised before
a decision is made about necessary action. The amygdala is directly responsible for
triggering the fear response. The fear or stress response initiates a chain of biochemical and
behavioural changes. This includes; activation of the Sympathetic Nervous System which is
responsible for the release of catecholamines; the Autonomic Nervous System and finally
the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis which is responsible for activating corticotropin
releasing factor which stimulates the adrenal gland to release Cortisol (Yehuda 2000). The
catecholamines, including norepinephrine are responsible for energising the body and in
moderate amounts they facilitate the consolidation of explicit memories (Yehuda 2000;
Charney, Deutch, Krystal, Southwick, & Davis 1993). The Cortisol which is released will
eventually inhibit the fear response through a negative feedback loop which connects the
hippocampus, hypothalamus, pituitary-adrenal systems before returning to the hippocampus.
In this way the effect the catecholamines have on memory are modulated by levels of
Cortisol.
In considering PTSD, it is useful to understand why, in some circumstances, the fear
response results in a post-traumatic syndrome and what effect this has on memory. At a
neurobiological level there appears to be a difference between the normal fear response and
a PTSD response despite them both being mediated by the same structures. At a biological
level once a stressor has been removed the fear response is inhibited through Cortisol
production and this allows the body to return to its normal state, the process described as
extinction. This process is facilitated by explicit memory as features of the current situation
are integrated into and then influenced by pre-existing information. It is in this way that
previous experience will influence the fear response and eventually leads to inhibition. In
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those individuals who develop PTSD this process is disrupted, as the way in which some of
the memory has been acquired does not seem to connect to information related to past
experience. Van der Kolk (1994) hypothesised that this is the result of the Cortisol failing to
inhibit the production of catecholamines. The excess catecholamines result in the memory
being 'overconsolidated' and it does not acquire spatial or temporal associations and it
cannot be influenced by previous experience. One manifestation of this is, that despite
being removed from the stressful situation and knowing that the stressor is no longer
present, the individual continues to react as though the event was recurring. When they are
exposed to reminders of the event they re-experience it with the same intense level of
arousal. It appears as though, in those people who develop PTSD, the process of extinction
has not been completed. This results in an individual's 'fear network' being constantly
activated and easily triggered (Yule 1999).
Current descriptions of the neurobiology of fear and PTSD suggest that, during intense
stress, memory is processed in a different way. This is evident by what is described as
psychogenic amnesia experienced by some, contrasting with the intrusive re-experiencing
reported by others. For some, during a traumatic experience, both explicit and implicit
aspects of memory appear to be stored in a more robust way. Despite having knowledge
about the way in which brain injury disrupts the explicit system it is not known if, or how,
brain injury would affect the acquisition of traumatic explicit memory. As the encoding of
explicit memory is enhanced during intense stress, and because implicit processing
contributes to trauma memory, it is possible that some features of the traumatic experience
could be stored despite brain injury.
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1:4 PTSD and Brain Injury
1:4:1 PTSD through implicit memory
There is still a considerable amount that we do not know about how memory is acquired and
stored. What is clear from the discussion so far, is that memory is not processed in the usual
way during extreme stress. McNeil & Greenwood (1996) proposes that the emotional
significance of an event, which could produce a sense of helplessness or horror and involve
a threat to life, could even be strong enough to override the defect in explicit memory
associated with brain injury. Even if it did not, it is still probable that sensory and
perceptual representations of the event are encoded at an implicit level. Krikorian & Layton
(1998) described a patient who developed PTSD following anoxic brain injury. The patient
had been buried under sand for a period of 15 minutes following a construction accident.
The anoxic injury resulted in a coma which lasted for two days and post-traumatic amnesia
which lasted several weeks. As well as being amnesic for the accident the patient had
retrograde amnesia for approximately 15 years prior to the accident, which could indicate
extensive hippocampal disruption. It was not until some weeks after being discharged from
hospital that the patient's wife reported that his personality had changed. Although this type
of report is not uncommon following brain injury (Brooks, et al 1986), it became apparent to
the authors that the patient was experiencing a post-traumatic reaction. Despite having no
conscious recall of the accident he described symptoms which were representative of it. The
authors concluded that although the patient's declarative memory had been disrupted due to
the reduced oxygen to his brain, his implicit system had processed certain aspects of the
event, including the fear and some sensory images. Although it could be argued that the
patient developed PTSD vicariously the authors believe this to be unlikely as his symptoms
developed while he was still in a period of confusion. This provides some evidence for the
suggestion that non-declarative or implicit memory is a crucial mechanism in PTSD after
brain injury. Despite this, Sbordone & Liter (1995) are of the opinion that if implicit
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processing of trauma during brain injury was possible there would have been some evidence
of PTSD in their study. However, their study had a number of limitations, in particular as
the sample was very small and taking into account prevalence rates in general, it might
simply have been that they have failed to find examples of PTSD because their sample was
too small to detect them.
1:4:2 Traumatic islands of memory
The evidence indicating that PTSD does occur after brain injury continues to accumulate. In
addition to implicit memory there are other mechanisms by which PTSD symptoms could
occur. Post-traumatic amnesia refers to the length of time which elapses before a patient
who has been unconscious regains their ability to lay down continuous new memories.
During the period of PTA, islands of memory occur in at least one third of all mild head
injury cases (Gronwall & Wrightson 1980). Post-traumatic amnesia is a period during
which consciousness fluctuates and where an individual might be able to acquire some new
memories although this is not being done in a continuous way. King (1997a) suggested that
the period of variable consciousness which occurs during post-traumatic amnesia would be
sufficient to allow some 'islands' of memory to be stored. He presented a case study
describing a man who, after being struck from behind by a car while he was walking, went
on to develop PTSD. The patient had only a single memory relating to the incident, which
had been laid down when he was in a period of intermittent consciousness. It was this
memory that had become the source of his re-experiencing. King (1997a) hypothesised that
these 'islands' occur because, as discussed above, the intensity of the emotional and
physiological arousal has been intense enough to establish an explicit memory of the event.
This is the mechanism sometimes known as creating 'flashbulb memories' (Brown & Kulik
1977) which are particularly vivid and long-lasting memories, which have been encoded
more strongly due to the suddenness or significance of the event.
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1:4:3 Post injury memories
McNeil & Greenwood (1996) described a case study of a patient who had been the
pedestrian victim of a road traffic accident which had been an intentional attack on his life.
He experienced a severe head injury and also developed symptoms consistent with PTSD
diagnosis. In this case it was suggested that the PTSD developed in response to information
given after the event. Once the patient had regained consciousness it appears that he was
vicariously traumatised by information given to him about the attack. DSM-IV permits
diagnosis even if the event has not been directly experienced. It allows that other people can
be traumatised by witnessing or hearing about a life threatening event which has occurred to
a close friend or family member. O' Carroll et al, (1999) in their study of PTSD subsequent
to having variceal haemorrhage noted that a number of participants had commented that the
experience had been more distressing for their partners and family members. Vicarious
experience is therefore consistent with the diagnosis of PTSD.
An elaboration of this is the construction of pseudo memory, based on what the individual
imagines to have occurred. McMillan (1996) reported that the period of amnesia for some
patients is itself traumatic, and the gaps in memory might be filled by creating a narrative, or
by the patient visualising themselves being in the accident. The usual experience for brain
injured patients is that they regain consciousness in hospital, often having severe physical
injuries, perhaps being told how close to death they had been, yet having no recollection of
how they came to be in that situation. They may then develop ideas and beliefs about the
event which can subsequently become the source of the traumatic re-experiencing.
Developing PTSD symptoms on the basis of the mental construction of a traumatic event is
consistent with PTSD in other populations (Shalev et al, 1993). Miller (1999) discussed
four case studies of individuals who had no loss of consciousness, who constructed
scenarios which reflected hypothetical outcomes of their traumatic experiences. In one case,
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the patient had fallen from a roof only narrowly missing a large metal spike. He later
reported intrusive images which centred around what might have happened had he landed a
couple of inches closer to the spike. The idea that a patient may construct an image which
then becomes the source of traumatic re-experiencing is not an unusual feature of PTSD
symptoms.
The images, whether constructed or accurate recollections of events, can be equally
traumatic as shown by research by Bryant & Harvey (1998). They compared three groups
on the intrusive imagery they experienced. The groups were PTSD patients who had
accurate recall of the trauma, PTSD patients who had amnesia for the event and a group of
PTSD symptom simulators who acted as a control group. The hypothesis was that the group
without recall of the trauma, would report the same degree of belief in the accuracy of their
images as the group with accurate recall. This hypothesis was based on source monitoring
theory which describes that a belief in the accuracy ofmemories is attributed to those which
are accompanied by perceptual and contextual detail (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay
1993). The study supported the hypothesis that there was no difference between the
intrusions reported by PTSD patients with and without accurate recall of the event, on the
variables of imagery, intrusiveness and the affect associated with the images. The
explanation proposed by the authors was consistent with the theory of Brewin et al (1996) of
dual representation. They suggested that the patients who had been amnesic for the event
had actually encoded a non-verbal memory of the event, which then provided the source of
the re-experiencing. The importance of this type of research is that, whatever mechanisms
are operating, patients with brain injury do report PTSD. They have also been found to re-
experience the event consistently and Bryant & Harvey's (1998) study demonstrated that
this is accompanied in some patients with the belief that what is being re-experienced is an
accurate account of the event. Whether the recall is accurate or not may not be entirely
relevant to the debate ofwhether or not PTSD can occur.
16
On reviewing the literature it is apparent that there is more evidence to suggest that PTSD
can occur after brain injury than that it cannot. In some studies symptoms of PTSD have
been reported to have been found in as many as 84 per cent of patients with co-morbid mild
brain injuries (Feinstein, Hershkop, Jardine, & Ouchterlony 2000). Bryant & Harvey (2000)
reported a PTSD prevalence of 27 per cent in a sample of patients who had severe brain
injuries. Although the mechanisms involved in acquisition of traumatic memory and
development of PTSD might be different in those with and without brain injury, it is clear
from these studies that there is evidence PTSD can occur following both mild and severe
brain injury.
1:4:4 If the mechanisms are different is it still PTSD?
It could be that as a consequence of different mechanisms the symptom profile may be
different although McMillan (1996) reported that his dual diagnosis patients experienced the
full range of PTSD symptoms, including intrusive thoughts and nightmares. However, in a
later study, Bryant & Harvey (2000) reported that only 19 per cent of those brain injured
patients with co-morbid PTSD had intrusive imagery, although 96 per cent reported
symptoms of emotional and physiological reactivity. Perhaps it is not as Adler suggested in
1943 that loss of consciousness protects from the development of PTSD in its entirety, but
that some symptoms are likely to be less prevalent than others. It might be as Bryant &
Harvey (2000) conclude, that loss of consciousness is protective in reducing the likelihood
that PTSD patients will experience intrusive imagery. This might also help explain the lack
of PTSD found in the study of Sbordone & Liter (1995) and Mayou et al (1993). However,
it does not mean that because the symptom profile is different that it is not PTSD. The DSM
IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) gives equal weighting to all symptoms with
none being more important than any other (Solomon, Neria, Ohry, Waysman, & Ginzburg,
1994). Furthermore, it is consistent with other trauma research for some symptoms to be
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reported more frequently than others and there is no profde of symptoms that is considered
to reflect 'typical' PTSD. In the general trauma literature different types of trauma are
already found to be associated with different post-traumatic reactions. The PTSD reaction
associated with combat for example, has been found to differ from that associated with
civilian traumas. North, Smith & Spitznagel (1994) reported that the most frequently
reported symptoms of survivors of a mass shooting in the US was intrusive recollections.
Solomon, et al (1994) also reported intrusions as the most frequently reported symptoms of
combat veterans. However, Blanchard et al (1995) reported that in their study the most
frequently reported symptoms following car accidents were behavioural and cognitive
avoidance. Heffernan & Cloitre (2000) in their study described the victims of childhood
sexual abuse as reporting arousal and avoidance symptoms more than re-experiencing. A
different profile of PTSD symptoms in those with co-morbid brain injury would not be
inconsistent with diagnosis.
1:4:5 Is there evidence for a unique symptom profile?
As brain injury could be considered to be a unique type of stressor, it is possible that the
symptom profile might also have unique features. Turnbull, Campbell & Swann, (2001)
concluded in their study that brain injury did seem to alter the presentation of post-traumatic
symptoms. However, accepting different clinical subtypes of PTSD or even subsyndromal
presentations would not be incompatible with DSM IV diagnosis. Within the category of
PTSD, distinctions are drawn between acute versus chronic subtypes, and acute or delayed
onset. It is also generally accepted that despite the manifestation being different in other
groups it can nonetheless be classified as PTSD, for example, with children (Miller 1999).
Some studies have suggested that subsyndromal or partial forms ofPTSD, where the number
of criteria met might fall short of that required by DSM IV, might instead indicate a
different subtype of the disorder. Schnyder, Moergeli, Klaghofer & Buddeberg (2001)
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provided a definition of subsyndromal PTSD as those cases where criterion B was met as
well as either, criteria C or D.
A number of authors are of the opinion that PTSD is more accurately considered on a
continuum rather than as dichotomous (Yule, 1999). Consistent with this view Alarcon,
Deering, Glover, Ready, & Eddleman (1997) believe that it is more useful to describe PTSD
as a clinical typology with clinical subtypes. They suggest six subtypes of PTSD which are
based on the symptoms most prominent in the presentation. For example, the 'neurotic'
subtype presents with heightened psychomotor tension, phobic behaviour and evidence of
avoidant strategies, in addition to the core symptoms. The 'organomorphic' subtype
includes manifestation of cognitive impairments, including reduced information processing
ability and impaired concentration. In the Sbordone & Liter (1995) study, both the PTSD
group and the TBI group reported the same frequency and type of cognitive symptoms but
significant differences on re-experiencing indices. This might be suggestive of a different
profile of PTSD symptomatology in patients who have brain injury. There are a number of
reasons why it is likely that the manifestation of post-traumatic distress is different in the
acquired brain injury population:
1. Firstly, the event is processed differently and therefore there may be more emphasis on
some symptoms as opposed to others. This is consistent with studies which have
reported that intrusive symptoms are less frequently reported in trauma patients who have
also sustained brain injury. These patients have also tended to report feeling less afraid
and less helpless than non-brain injured patients during the traumatic event (Bryant &
Harvey 1995; Bryant & Harvey 1999). As well as the acute symptom presentation being
different other research has suggested that the longitudinal course might also be
different. Bryant & Harvey (1999) compared PTSD patients with and without brain
injury at two time points. They found that the TBI group experienced less intrusive
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imagery than the non-TBI group in the acute stage but, that at six months, there was no
significant difference in rates of intrusions. In fact, the TBI group reported more
intrusions while the non-TBI group reported less.
2. The physical impairments and disabilities which can accompany brain injury could also
result in a different manifestation of the disorder. As PTSD is associated with increased
stress it might be that the increased stress associated with psychological adjustment to a
brain injury, is the final precipitant (Miller, 1999). The symptoms might not develop
until the individual has returned home and is forced to confront any limitations, they may
have. This could suggest an increased risk of delayed onset PTSD in this group. King
(1997a) described a case study where the patient did not present with symptoms which
met diagnostic criteria for PTSD until four months after being discharged. McMillan
(1991) also described delayed onset ofPTSD following severe brain injury.
3. In addition to point 2, it is possible that avoidance of reminders of the event might not be
feasible immediately following the injury. The individual is likely to be hospitalised and
is therefore not able to avoid reminders, which could include the hospital, medical
interventions or the physical injuries which were consequences of the event. As this may
produce a flooding effect rather than the usual avoidance, it is possible the symptoms
will present differently. The low PTSD prevalence reported by O' Carroll et al, (1999)
was explained as the participants being unable to avoid reminders of the incident due to
the haemorrhage having occurred in the patients' own homes. The same may apply to
brain injured patients.
4. It could also be that events subsequent to the stressor contribute to a different
presentation of symptoms, for example the focus following brain injury tends to be
medically orientated, with the emphasis on physical recovery. This might also result in
delayed onset of the symptoms (Miller 1999).
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5. The features of post-concussional syndrome will mean than certain symptoms of PTSD
are presented differently or more frequently, thus contributing to an altered presentation
of symptoms. For example, concentration impairment is a common sequelae of brain
injury while also being a feature of PTSD. Due to the overlap in PTSD and post-
concussional symptoms it would be easy to attribute some PTSD symptoms to an organic
basis even when they are exacerbated by the post trauma reaction.
6. As discussed earlier, the lack of recall of the event might not be a protective factor but an
exacerbating one. The impaired recall and 'absence' which many brain injured
individuals report, may exacerbate feelings of dissociation and distress. Inability to
recall the event has also been associated with poor adjustment (Bryant & Flarvey 1999).
A specific presentation would also be consistent with Brewin's (2001) model of PTSD. As
it could be argued that brain injury interferes with the production of verbally accessible
memories, it may increase the likelihood that PTSD will develop as the information stored
within the situationally accessible system predominates. Brewin (2001) argues that:
"any factor that interferes with the construction ofa detailed, consciously accessible
memory for intense moments of the trauma would be predicted to lead to a worse
outcome" (Brewin 2001, p384).
It may be that due to the inability to recall the event, PTSD is more likely to occur following
brain injury. It is not uncommon for people with no recall of their brain injury to become
preoccupied with trying to find out what happened to them.
Ohry, Rattock, & Solomon (1996) reported that 33 per cent of their traumatically brain
injured sample met full diagnostic criteria for PTSD. They explored the pattern of
symptoms which had been reported, and concluded that the most prevalent were amnesia for
the event, poor concentration and physiological reactivity. The least endorsed symptoms
included intrusive re-experiencing. Scores from the Impact of Events scale indicated that
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the TBI group had higher levels of avoidance than intrusions, a finding contrary to that in
studies involving combat survivors, which indicate that intrusion sub-scale scores are
usually higher than the avoidance scores (Solomon, Neria, Ohry, Waysman, & Ginzburg
1994). This finding raise raises two questions: a) why are avoidance scores high when there
is no recollection of the event, and b) what could the function of avoidance be? In other
PTSD populations, avoidance is considered to be a strategy adopted to reduce exposure to
reminders of the event which result psychological distress and heightened physiological
arousal. If there is no memory to be reminded of, it opens a debate on why avoidance would
be high. This evidence further supports the contention that there is a clinical typology of
PTSD associated with brain injury.
It seems therefore, that there is considerable evidence to suggest that, during a TBI, it is
possible to have processed sufficient information to allow PTSD to develop. Furthermore,
there is evidence from a number of studies that explicit memory is not required to develop
PTSD (Ohry et al 1996).
1:5 Cerebrovascular Accident and PTSD
1:5:1 Cerebrovascular accident
Traumatic brain injury affects approximately 90,000 people in Scotland every year (Currie,
Ritchie, & Stott 2000). The number of people affected by cerebrovascular accident (CVA)
or stroke, as it is more commonly known, is less than TBI at roughly 15,000 people each
year (SIGN Guidelines, 2001).
Cerebrovascular accident (CVA) is brain injury which is due to a disruption to the blood
supply in the brain caused by two main mechanisms:
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1. Ischaemia - which is the result of an artery being obstructed. This can be thrombotic
when blood flow is reduced due to a change in the walls of the blood vessel, or embolic
when the occlusion is due to material formed elsewhere breaking off and then lodging in
the vessel. If brain tissue is sufficiently deprived of oxygenated blood, permanent injury
can result, referred to as infarction (Lezak 1995). Certain arteries are more likely to be
affected than others. Blockage most commonly occurs at points where vessels bifurcate.
The outcome of an ischaemic stroke depends on which vessel was occluded, the extent
to which it was blocked and whether a collateral vessel to continue to supply blood, was
available.
2. Haemorrhage - which can be due to one of three main mechanisms; a ruptured
aneurysm, arteriovenous malformation or an intracerebral bleed. In the case of the first
two the ruptured artery results in blood being released into the sub-arachnoid space,
allowing it to leak onto the brains surface before it penetrates the brain substance. An
aneurysm is a weakness in the wall of the blood vessel which can 'balloon' out, filling
with blood to the point where it ruptures. An arteriovenous malformation is less
common accounting for only 1 per cent of haemorrhagic strokes (Lezak 1995). It refers
to a developmental malformation of a vessel which means the arteries and veins are not
formed properly, as a result of which they are prone to recurrent rupture. With both
types of precipitant the blood flow into the brain is rapid and is often accompanied by
sudden raising of intracranial pressure. The third mechanism of haemorrhagic brain
injury is intracerebral bleeding where blood goes directly into the brain's substance.
The blood destroys the brain tissue and also causes pressure effects, large haemorrhages
frequently cause death in this way by displacing vital structures. This bleeding tends to
be in a localised region and is often associated with hypertension or trauma.
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The prevalence, symptoms and course of these different types of stroke vary. Ischaemic
strokes are more common and account for approximately 80 per cent of all strokes (Caplan
& Stein 1986). Thrombotic strokes usually occur when the individual's circulatory system
is least active, meaning it often occurs at night or on first waking. The embolic and
haemorrhagic strokes occur when circulation is more active and when blood pressure rises.
It could be that people have more awareness that something is wrong with embolisms or
haemorrhages, a factor which could prove to be important in the development of PTSD.
During an ischaemic stroke, loss of consciousness is rare, occurring in only 15 per cent of
patients (Caplan & Stein 1986). This is because there is usually a collateral blood supply
which is available to provide the minimum level of oxygen required to maintain
consciousness. It is also very unusual that the brain stem, which controls the level of
consciousness, would be affected by ischaemia unless it's own vessels are those which are
disrupted. As there is no sudden release of blood or raised intracranial pressure, few
patients will experience a headache. In contrast, a sub-arachnoid haemorrhage (SAH) is
usually accompanied by an excruciating headache with only 5 per cent of patients having no
accompanying headache (Chicoine & Dacey 1997). The patient will usually vomit and then
experience a reduced level of consciousness. Patients who suffer a SAH are more than four
times as likely as ischaemic patients to lose consciousness (Caplan & Stein 1986). This is
the result of blood escaping into the brain tissue which, by various mechanisms including
vasospasms (sudden contraction of vessels) often results in impaired consciousness. With
an intracerebral haemorrhage the patient tends to decline more slowly, they may experience
a headache and vomiting in the later stages before their consciousness reduces.
1:5:2 Cerebral circulation and mood disorders
The brain receives its blood supply from the internal carotid and the vertebro-basilar
arteries. The internal carotid artery gives off a number of minor branches, before splitting
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into the anterior and middle cerebral arteries. The vertebro-basilar artery serves the
posterior cerebral arteries. The junction of a number of the main arteries known as the
Circle of Willis, includes the anterior communicating, anterior cerebral, internal carotid,
posterior communicating and posterior cerebral. Strokes can affect any of these arteries.
Frequent sites for ischaemia include the origin of the internal carotid artery, the lower
portion of the basilar artery, the stem of the middle cerebral artery and posterior cerebral
artery. Approximately 80 per cent of SAH are due to a ruptured aneurysm occurring
somewhere within the Circle of Willis (Chicoine & Dacey 1997), with the most common
site of rupture being the anterior communicating artery or the middle cerebral artery
bifurcation. With an intracerebral haemorrhage it is more likely that brain stem structures,
for example, basal ganglia or pons will be affected.
As cerebral infarction usually affects a relatively specific area of the brain a number of
investigations have attempted to relate mood disorders to specific brain locations especially
as mood disorders are known to be common following stroke (Schramke, Stowe, Ratcliff,
Goldstein, & Condray 1998; Sharpe, Hawton, House, Molyneux, Sandercock, Bamford &
Warlow 1990). MacHale, O'Rourke, Wardlaw & Dennis (1998) reported that in their
sample 26 per cent met DSM criteria for either an anxiety or a depressive disorder. Sharpe
et al (1990) reported an overall prevalence rate for depression of 18 per cent in their sample
of stroke patients. Although most research has concentrated on post-stroke depression,
Sharpe et al (1990) concluded that anxiety is probably more common post-stroke than
depression. Robinson, Starr, & Price (1984) reported a higher prevalence of depression in
stroke patients where the left hemisphere had been affected. In a later study, Starkstein &
Robinson (1989) reported that left hemisphere strokes which were located in the frontal and
basal ganglia regions were associated with more frequent cases of depression. They also
concluded from scan data that the closer the lesion was to the frontal pole the greater the
severity of depression. In contrast, Sharpe et al (1990) found no evidence of a link between
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depression and site of lesion. The most recent review of all of the literature relevant to
depression and lesion location concluded that studies which had suggested a link between
location and depression were methodologically flawed and that no relationship has yet been
confirmed (Carson, et al 2000).
Some recent investigations into PSTD have proposed the presence of a similar link between
PTSD and specific brain areas. Freeman & Kimbrell (2000) reported that in their patient
who had PTSD, right frontal damage reduced the frequency of his intrusive symptoms. This
finding is supported by the reports of the right hemisphere being important in storage and
retrieval of traumatic memories (Berthier, Posada, & Puentes 2001). However, Berthier et
al (2001) described the case of a combat veteran who did not develop PTSD symptoms until
after he sustained a traumatic brain injury. They proposed that the affected right frontal area
identified on the scan, had functioned prior to injury, to inhibit his intrusive symptoms.
However, although both studies implicate the right anterior region, one suggests it had the
effect of reducing intrusive re-experiencing while the other suggests lesions to this area
precipitated these symptoms.
1:5:3 Stroke and PTSD
There is a paucity of literature on post-trauma reactions following stroke, despite criterion A
from DSM IV for post-traumatic stress disorder being met by the experience of stroke per
se. The individual has been exposed to an event in which injury is likely to have occurred
and where the response could feasibly involve intense fear, helplessness or horror. The
issue of whether individuals can experience criterion B, persistent re-experiencing of the
event, is an issue that this study addresses. It may be necessary to exclude organic reasons
for the criteria of section C, in particular inability to recall the event and impaired
concentration, both of which could be attributable to brain injury. In research of PTSD and
traumatic brain injury it is the symptoms of criterion D which have proved most difficult to
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separate from those of the post-concussional syndrome. In stroke, the absence of post-
concussional syndrome makes it possible to attribute symptoms to PTSD per se, rather than
to post-concussional symptoms. Therefore, by considering a population of stroke patients
this confounding variable will be removed and the pitfalls of dual diagnosis of brain injury
and PTSD, as described by McMillan (2001), will be avoided.
In a literature review only two papers were found to have concentrated on PTSD following
stroke. Berry (1998) investigated the nature of the psychological distress reported by
patients who had experienced SAH. All of the participants in her study complained of
anxiety, loss of confidence and impaired memory. Some also reported being preoccupied
with the suddenness of their experience. Thirty-two percent of the sample reported
experiencing recurrent intrusive imagery, nightmares, and flashbacks and the entire sample
reported behavioural avoidance and increased physiological arousal. The study concluded a
prevalence rate for PTSD of 32 per cent. The fear of recurrence was reported to be a
particularly salient feature in this population, as was catastrophic misinterpretation of
normal physiological sensations. This contributes further evidence that the typology of
PTSD following brain injury might be different. Sembi et al (1998) aimed to establish
whether a syndrome, which would meet either full or partial diagnostic criteria for PTSD,
existed in a sample of patients who had ischaemic strokes. They estimated a post-stroke
prevalence of PTSD of 7 per cent using the Penn Inventory, and 21 per cent using the Impact
of Events scale, although neither of these is diagnostic. A diagnostic interview for those
patients who had met cut-off levels on self-report measures established the prevalence rate
at approximately 10 per cent. No correlation was found in this sample between the
avoidance scale on the IES, and a measure of physical disability, suggesting that avoidance
behaviour was more likely to be a consequence of cognitive processes rather than a result of
physical limitations. The authors concluded that the patients in the study presented with
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symptoms of arousal, intrusion and avoidance, which they interpreted as suggesting that the
patients had, "appraised the event as extremely traumatic and had subsequently developed a
traumatic reaction" (Sembi et al, 1998 p321). Both studies provide evidence for the
existence of PTSD following stroke. The role that loss of consciousness and memory of the
event has on the development of PTSD, was not discussed in either paper. As the type of
brain impairment associated with stroke tends to be more focal than in a concussional brain
injury, this means it is more likely that individuals will recall the event, even when they
have subsequently lost consciousness. Furthermore, as the onset is more gradual than in
TBI, some information about the experience might be stored. By including both ischaemic
and haemorrhagic patients it will be possible to compare one group that is more likely to
lose consciousness and lack explicit memory of the event with another group that is less
likely to lose consciousness. Furthermore, it will be possible to compare the effect the type
of stroke has on prevalence of PTSD. By exploring the symptoms reported it will also be
possible to contribute to the growing evidence of a different manifestation of PTSD
following brain injury.
1:6 Aims and hypotheses of the study
The main aim of this study was to ascertain whether the experience of cerebrovascular
accident could precipitate a post-traumatic reaction. Furthermore, the study considered
whether consciousness and memory of the event are required to develop PTSD. As some
studies suggest an association between PTSD and the right hemisphere, the study aimed to
investigate the presence of this type of relationship in a stroke population. This study also
aimed to investigate whether the symptoms reported after CVA are the same as in other
groups, in particular to consider whether there is a typology of PTSD which could be said to
be specific to acquired brain injury populations.
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Study Hypotheses
Further to the review of the literature and consistent with the aims of the study the
hypotheses were:-
• Hypothesis One: It is hypothesised that a cerebrovascular accident can result in
PTSD as defined by DSM IV. It is predicted that PTSD will be present in this
sample.
• Hypothesis Two: It is hypothesised that loss of consciousness during
cerebrovascular accident does not prevent the development of PTSD. In this study
it is predicted that the participants who have both lost consciousness and developed
PTSD would not be equal to zero.
• Hypothesis Three: It is hypothesised that following CVA memory of the event is not
required to develop PTSD. In this study it is predicted that the number of
participants who have no memory of the event and who also developed PTSD would
not be equal to zero.
• Hypothesis Four: It is hypothesised that PTSD will be diagnosed more in the group
of individuals who had right-sided lesions than in the group who had non right-sided
lesions.
• Hypothesis Five: It is hypothesised that following CVA participants will experience





Ethical approval was sought and obtained from the Lothian Region Ethics Committee.
Approval was applied for in December 2000 and given in January 2001. The only
stipulation was that neither medical nor psychological case notes were to be reviewed prior
to the individuals concerned having given their consent to participate in the project. This
necessitated a change to the proposed recruitment process.
The planned recruitment procedure would have involved screening all patients discharged
from the Brain Injury Service at the Astley Ainslie Hospital over the preceding year prior to
contacting them regarding participation. The screening would have involved the researcher
reviewing the medical records of potential participants who met the inclusion criteria.
Those patients who had severe cognitive deficits or dysphasia would have been excluded
from the study prior to them being contacted. However, as the Ethics committee did not
give permission for medical notes to be reviewed prior to the patient having given consent,
the recruitment procedure was altered. It would not have been feasible in the time-scale of
the project to recruit participants, gain consent and then exclude anyone with severe
language problems or cognitive impairments. It was decided instead to rely on consultants
and other psychologists to identify those participants who met the inclusion criteria. Once
this initial screen had been completed the researcher would approach the remaining
individuals to invite them to participate.
2:2 Participants
2:2:1 Recruitment
A total of 32 patients agreed to participate in this study. They were recruited from the
rehabilitation services provided at Astley Ainslie Hospital, Edinburgh. This service is a
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national resource and as such provides assessment and rehabilitation to patients from all
over the country. Within the rehabilitation service, potential participants were drawn from
two sources. Firstly, the Scottish Brain Injury Rehabilitation Service which provided
patients who had a diagnosis mainly of sub-arachnoid haemorrhage and secondly, from the
Stroke Rehabilitation Service which provided patients who had experienced ischaemic
strokes. It was decided to use two sources; firstly to investigate the role type of stroke might
have on development of PTSD; secondly to increase the total sample size; and thirdly to
ensure the sample was representative of the general stroke population. All participants had
received either assessment and/or rehabilitation from the rehabilitation services at the Astley
Ainslie Hospital.
Initially, three consultants within the hospital were approached and asked to identify
potential participants who met the inclusion criteria. The inclusion criteria for the study
were as follows:
Inclusion criteria: Exclusion criteria:
• cerebrovascular accident of either ischaemic or • severe cognitive deficits
haemorrhagic origin
• out-patient • dysphasia
• aged 18 - 65 years
• at least three months since injury
The potential participants were drawn from those who had been discharged from the service
in the year 2000. This yielded a total sample of 72 potential participants. A further 5
patients were identified via out-patient clinics at the psychology department. Consultants or
psychologists reported significant cognitive deficits or dysphasia in 18 of the 77 potential
participants: this reduced the potential participants to 59. A further 5 people were excluded
as they no longer attended the hospital for rehabilitation and they lived too far from the
study base for the researcher to visit them at home. In accordance with the inclusion criteria
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a further 6 patients were excluded due to age or type of injury which resulted in the total
number of participants approached being 48. All of these potential participants were sent an
information sheet (Appendix 2) which provided details about the project as well as
explaining what the interview session would entail. Forty-two were followed up by
telephone to provide each participant with the opportunity to ask any questions they may
have had as well as to establish whether or not they wanted to participate in the study. The
6 who could not be contacted by telephone were sent a second letter. Only one participant
responded to this. Of those followed up 10 declined to participate. No information is
available about their reasons for this. Due to the restrictions imposed by the Ethics board
case notes pertaining to these patients could not be reviewed, therefore no conclusions can
be drawn regarding any similarity or difference to the obtained sample. One person who
had agreed to participate was unable to do so due to re-admission to hospital. This meant
the total sample was 32, which equated to a 67 per cent take up rate.
2:2:2 Demographics
The mean age of the sample was 51 years (sd =9 years ) and ranged between 35 and 65
years. The sample included 14 males and 18 females. The mean time since injury was 14
months (sd=18 months) and ranged between 3 months and 9 years. With the outlier
removed the mean time since stroke was 11 months (sd=5). The sample included; 8 patients
who had infarct strokes, 4 who had intracerebral haemorrhages (ICH) and 20 who had sub¬
arachnoid haemorrhages (SAH). The ICH and SAH groups were combined to make a single
group of haemorrhagic stroke participants. Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) scores were
available for 26 of the participants. The scores ranged from 3 to 15 with the mean being 12
(sd=4). Based on GCS score the majority of the sample would be classified as having had a
brain injury of mild-moderate severity. Duration of post traumatic amnesia (PTA) was
calculated for all participants. This was based on patient's self-report and confirmed,
32
whenever possible, using information documented in the case notes. The mean PTA was 15
days (sd=17 days) and ranged from 0 to 84 days. Using assessment of PTA as an index of
injury severity the majority of the sample would be classified as having had severe brain
injuries. The discrepancy with classification based on GCS only can partly be explained by
the period of fluctuating consciousness which is included in PTA assessment but not
generally recorded in case notes as part of a GCS assessment.
2:3 Design
The aims and hypotheses of this study required that it be conducted in two stages, with each
stage having a different design. The first stage was to determine whether Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) can occur after stroke and the prevalence of PTSD in the entire
sample of 32 participants was assessed using descriptive statistics. As this was a prevalence
study it did not require a control group and the rates were compared with other published
PTSD prevalence rates. The second stage of the study was a between-subjects design, and
as it essentially compared two experimental groups, a control group was not required for this
stage either. Hypotheses two, three and four required that participants be allocated to
different groups depending on one of three grouping variables. This meant that participants
could belong to a different group for each condition. The variables used to allocate
participants to the groups were loss of consciousness, recall of the event and site of stroke.
As the group allocation was not fixed it was not possible to match the groups.
2:4 Power analysis
In order to assess prevalence of PTSD post-stroke the entire sample was used. Power
analysis was not required at this point as only descriptive statistics were to be used. For the
secondary hypotheses, inferential statistics were used and the power analysis was as
follows:- from previous trauma literature a medium to large effect size was predicted
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(Cohen's d = 0.6-0.8). To achieve statistical power of 0.85 each group would need 30
participants, therefore the total sample required was 60. For the data which was analysed
using Chi-squared the power and effect sizes were as follows:- again, predicting a medium
to large effect size (Cohen's w = 0.4-0.6) with an anticipated sample size of 60, the results
would have power of 0.87-0.97.
However, due to circumstances outwith the researcher's control the obtained sample size
was smaller than was required to ensure the study had sufficient power. During the study,
the designated ward for patients who have had infarct strokes experienced staffing
difficulties. Unfortunately, this resulted in potential participants not being identified for the
study. The number of participants obtained was less than expected and unfortunately, less
than had been available. Although the total sample size obtained falls short of that predicted
and required to ensure power, it is not untypical in brain injury research which has generally
used small samples or single case design (see McMillan 1996; Ohry et al 1996). Studies
which use a haemorraghic stroke sample are likely to be smaller as this type of injury only
comprises 20 per cent of the total stroke population (Caplan & Stein 1986). Additionally,
the survival rate for patients who have experienced a haemorrhagic stroke is small, with a
30-day fatality rate of 50 per cent (Caplan & Stein 1986). It could therefore be concluded,
that despite being below that predicted, the sample size is reasonable.
Retrospective power calculations were produced for the three main hypotheses. The
harmonic mean was used due to the unequal sample sizes.
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Power Calculations for the Three Main Hypotheses
Measures Harmonic n Effect size Power
Hypothesis two (I) 14 0.5 (medium) 0.35
Hypothesis two (A) 14 0.8 (large) 0.66
Hypothesis two (T) 14 0.9 (large) 0.75
Hypothesis three (I) 12 0.5 (medium) 0.3
Hypothesis three (A) 12 0.6 (medium) 0.4
Hypothesis three (T) 12 0.6 (medium) 0.4
Hypothesis four (I) 15 0.07 (small) 0.01
Hypothesis four (A) 15 0.3 (small) 0.19
Hypothesis four (T) 15 0.4 (small) 0.27
/ = Intrusions
A = Avoidance
T= Total Impact ofEvents scale score.
Clark-Carter (1997) suggests using those effect sizes which were initially described by
Cohen. A small effect is 0.20, a medium effect is 0.5 and 0.8 is a large effect. The power
analysis indicates that this study was under powered. To have achieved generally accepted
power of 0.80 the group sizes would have required to have been as follows:
I. For hypothesis two : Loss of consciousness
A. to test intrusion a sample of 140 would be required
B. to test avoidance a sample of 35 would be required
C. to test the total IES score a sample of 25 would be required.
II. For hypothesis three: Memory of the event
A. to test intrusion a sample of 140 would be required
B. to test avoidance a sample of 80 would be required
C. to test the total IES score a sample of 80 would be required
III. For hypothesis four: Right-sided lesions
A. to test intrusion a sample of>1000 would be required
B. to test avoidance a sample >1000 would be required
C. to test the total IES score a sample of 400 would be required
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This suggests that as the effect sizes found for hypotheses three and four were very small,
the sample sizes required to detect a significant difference would have been outwith the
scope of this study. However, the effect size for hypothesis two was large and a sample of
35 per group would have been large enough to increase the power in this study.
2:5 External validity
The response rate in this study was high at 67 per cent. It is therefore unlikely that the
sample could be said to be self-selected. The study only includes those patients who had
mild-moderate cognitive deficits and, those who were not dysphasic. This means patients
with left hemisphere strokes and stroke which resulted in severe cognitive impairments are
not represented by this sample. The sample includes participants aged 65 years or less and
is therefore not representative of the general population of infarct stroke patients which
tends to be older. However, it is representative of the SAH population which tends to be
younger with the majority of haemorrhages being associated with 45-60 year olds (Kaplan &
Cerullo 1986). It was considered necessary to concentrate on younger stroke patients as it
would allow participants with different types of stroke to be compared.
2:6 Materials
Galveston Orientation and Amnesia Test (GOAT; Levin, O'Donnell & Grossman 19791
This is a brief measure which is administered as a semi-structured interview (Appendix 3).
It is based on the individual's self-report and provides a global score which represents the
patient's current level of disorientation. The items which comprise the GOAT include;
memory for the event, which allows evaluation of Post-traumatic Amnesia (PTA); and
memory prior to the event, which allows assessment of retrograde amnesia. The scale was
included in this study for three reasons; firstly to ensure all participants were orientated to
time and place; secondly to estimate their PTA and thirdly to gather information about the
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individual's recall of the event. Although the PTA duration was based on retrospective self-
report this is considered as reliable as PTA which has been measured prospectively
(McMillan, Jongen, & Greenwood 1996).
Post-traumatic Amnesia (PTA; Russell & Smith 1961)
Post-traumatic amnesia is considered to be the 'gold standard' in assessing severity and
predicting outcome after brain injury (McMillan et al 1996). Post-traumatic amnesia is
defined as the length of time between the injury and the point when continuous memory for
day to day events is restored. The duration of PTA includes both the period when the
patient is in a coma and the period where they experience 'islands ofmemory'. The original
classifications were provided by Russell & Smith (1961) cited in Levin et al (1979).
Although these were revised by Jennett & Teasdale (1981) into the current classifications.
The definitions are as follows:
• Less than five minutes: 'very mild injury'
• Five to sixty minutes: 'mild injury'
• One to twenty-four hours ' moderate injury'
• One to seven days: 'severe injury'
• One to four weeks: 'very severe injury'
• More than four weeks:' extremely severe injury'
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett 1974")
This is a widely used quantitative scale which assesses the severity of the injury by
measuring depth of unconsciousness. It comprises three sections; eye-opening, motor
response and verbal response. Patients are given a score according to their best response on
each section. The scoring is as follows; eye-opening 1-4; motor response 1-6 and verbal
response 1-5. The assessment provides a score between 3 and 15. In terms of severity of
injury, 3-5 is very severe, 6-8 is severe, 9-12 is moderate and 13-15 is mild. In this study the
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GCS score provides objective confirmation of whether a patient had lost consciousness.
This information was obtained from either medical or psychological case notes. Participants
were also asked whether they had lost consciousness and whether they had recall of the
event. The self-report method has been found to be generally accurate (Mayou, Black &
Bryant 2000).
Clock Drawing Test (Borod. Goodglass & Kaplan 1980)
The Clock Drawing Test was used so that participants with severe cognitive impairments
could be excluded from the study. It is a measure widely used in assessment of dementia but
was included in this study because it is quick to administer and complete. In order for the
task to be completed successfully a number of cognitive abilities are used. They include,
auditory comprehension, abstract thinking and concentration. All of these abilities were
considered necessary to participate in this study. This measure correlates highly with the
Mini-Mental State Examination (r =0.61) which is a measure used in screening for cognitive
impairment (Tombaugh & Mclntyre 1992).
There are a number of alternative procedures for scoring this test. Shulman (2000) provided
a comprehensive review and the procedure adopted by this study was the standardised
approach for administration and the five point scoring system recommended by Shulman,
Gold, Cohen, & Zucchero (1993). Each participant was presented with a pre-drawn circle
which was 10 centimetres in diameter. The following instruction was given - ' This circle
represents a clock-face. Please put the numbers in so it looks like a clock and then set the
time to 10 minutes past 11'. The scoring system used was:
• five for a perfect representation
• four for minor visuo-spatial errors
• three for an inaccurate representation of the time
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• two for moderate visuo-spatial disorganisation and inaccurate presentation of the time
• one for severe visuo-spatial disorganisation
• zero for inability to make a reasonable representation.
This scoring system was chosen as it was simple and yet provided assessment of
comprehension, executive ability and would highlight impulsivity.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAD; Zigmond & Snaith 1983)
This is a well known self-report measure which comprises 14 questions designed to detect
current levels of anxiety and depression in a non-psychiatric population. As it does not rely
on somatic symptoms it is less likely to be affected by co-morbid physical illness. In this
study, anxiety and depression were to be assessed in a population which was likely to have
residual physical symptoms. It was therefore considered to be the most appropriate
measure. The HAD has two sub-scales, each of which is scored separately. The measure
only assesses current symptoms as the patient is required to rate the symptoms they have
experienced over the past seven days. In this study the scores were used both as a measure
of psychological distress as well as to group participants into 'cases' and 'non cases'. The
recommended cut-off (score >8) was used to define participants as reaching caseness levels
of anxiety and depression.
Impact of Events Scale HES; Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez 1979)
This is a self-report measure of an individual's response to a traumatic event (Appendix 4).
It has 15 questions which separately measure symptoms of intrusion and avoidance.
Responses are scored on a four point scale. A response of 'not at all' would score zero, a
response of 'rarely' scores one, 'sometimes' three and 'often' is given five. The maximum
score is 60 and a higher scores reflects a report of more frequently experienced symptoms.
It is designed to assess the patient's current symptoms by assessing frequency over the
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preceding week. It has been widely used in both clinical and research practice but is not a
diagnostic tool and can be used only to report on PTSD symptomatology. The intrusion sub-
scale provides a seven item measure of the extent to which the event intrudes into the
person's consciousness. The avoidance sub-scale is eight items and measures the extent to
which the person engages in cognitive avoidance. Although this measure is intended to be
used descriptively, norms are available from the original study by Horowitz et al (1979).
This measure has previously been used with both traumatically brain injured and stroke
populations (Schnyder et al 2001 and Sembi et al 1998).
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1 Disorders (SCID; First. Spitzer. Gibbon &
Williams 1997).
This is a semi-structured clinical interview used to diagnose DSM IV Axis 1 disorders
(Appendix 5). The use of a standardised diagnostic interview to ascertain whether any of
the sample had PTSD ensured the prevalence rate would be reliable. The interview includes
questions which allow the clinician to explore the areas necessary to conclude if an
individual meets the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. The diagnostic criteria are given in
Appendix 1. Criterion E specifies that symptoms have been present for a minimum of one
month. In this study, the duration of symptoms was taken as the time since the stroke,
therefore all participants would be classified as meeting criterion E. It is possible to
distinguish between acute and chronic PTSD depending on whether the symptom duration is
greater or less than three months. The DSM IV structured clinical interview has been used
with a brain injured population (Hibbard et al 1998) and the DSM III-R version has been
used with a stroke population (Sharpe et al 1990). As the study was not assessing the
prevalence of all DSM Axis 1 disorders it was decided to use the clinician's version rather
than the research version. Furthermore, to reduce the time required for participants to
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In the patient information sheet participants were not informed that the purpose of the study
was to assess for PTSD. Instead it was decided to describe the study in general terms as an
investigation into the emotional consequences of having a stroke. There was a minimum of
two weeks between participants being sent the information sheet and the follow-up
telephone call being made. Those potential participants who were not contactable by
telephone were sent a letter which asked them to contact the researcher if they were
interested in participating in the project. The purpose of the follow-up telephone call was to
describe the purpose of the study in more detail and to explain what the session would
entail. It also gave participants the opportunity to ask questions. If participants consented to
take part in the study an appointment time was arranged.
2:7:2 Venue
For those participants who were already attending the hospital as out-patient's the
appointments for the study were arranged to coincide with other scheduled hospital visits.
Fifteen participants chose to be interviewed at home. This was due to either work
commitments or their mobility problems.
2:7:3 Interview
The data collection process took between one and two hours. The interview time for those
who were seen at home tended to be longer. All of the participants seen at home took more
time to complete the measures as they appeared more relaxed and talked more freely about
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their experiences. The majority of the domiciliary visits involved, on average, two hours
travelling time.
The format of the interview was as follows; all participants were given a few minutes to
read and sign the consent form (Appendix 6) before being asked the questions required to
complete the GOAT. They were then asked to complete the Clock-Drawing Test, the HAD
and lastly the IES. The session was concluded by the researcher administering the SCID. In
the case of two participants the questionnaires were read aloud by the researcher due to their
visual impairments. To conclude the session the aims of the research were re-iterated and
participants were given another opportunity to ask any questions or to add any information
they thought was relevant which had not been covered in the session. If requested,
arrangements were made to provide additional feedback once the project had been
completed. Participants were also reminded that they could contact the researcher at any
time if they did have any further questions. Finally, all participants were given a photocopy
of the consent form they had signed.
A small number of the participants became distressed in the course of the interviews. When
this occurred the interview was suspended and the participant was given an opportunity to
discuss their personal circumstances. Only when the researcher was sure that they were no
longer distressed were they asked whether they would like to continue. As stated in the
application for Ethical Approval, for those participants who were identified as being
significantly distressed a follow-up telephone call was made to the individual's GP or to any
other involved agencies. The aim of this was to highlight the need for the patient to be
reviewed or referred on to appropriate services. In all cases where the researcher considered
it necessary to contact the GP the participant was aware and had agreed that this could be
done.
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2:7:4 Case note review
Once the interviews were completed and consent had been given the patient's case notes
were reviewed. Psychology case notes were available from the department in which the
research was conducted. All participants had been assessed by the service, however four
sets of psychology case notes were missing. If following the review of the psychology notes
it was necessary to complete the data set with any further information the medical case notes
were also reviewed. Medical case notes were obtained from the Astley Ainslie medical
records department. The case note review provided demographic information, as well as
information relating to the circumstances surrounding admission to hospital, type and
severity of stroke, Glasgow Coma Scale scores and the duration of any loss of
consciousness. At this point copies of the consent form were filed in the patients case notes.
All of the participants gave their permission for their GPs to be notified of their decision to
take part in the project. Although a number of participants had already discussed the project
with their GPs a standard letter which provided a brief summary of the aims of the project
was sent to the GPs of all participants in the study.
2:8 Data analysis
The data was analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences version 10
(SPSS 10) for Windows computer package. The prevalence of PTSD within the entire
sample was assessed using descriptive statistics. On completing the descriptive statistics the
data was divided into two groups depending on particular variables allowing the hypotheses
which were based on each variable to be tested. Further analysis compared total IES scores,
avoidance and intrusion scores of each of the two groups. Between-groups t-tests were used
as the Impact of Events and HAD questionnaires are on an interval scale of measurement.
Chi squared was used to analyse the categorical data pertaining to PTSD diagnosis, anxiety
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and depression. Post-hoc analysis was conducted using a combination of parametric and
non-parametric analysis. The variables explored included type of stroke experienced, sex





A total of thirty-two individuals were interviewed for this study. One person diagnosed as
having PTSD was excluded. This individual had been the victim of an assault two weeks
prior to having his stroke. It was necessary to exclude him as the stressor which precipitated
his PTSD could not clearly be identified as having been the stroke. This reduced the sample
size to thirty-one for analysis. The mean age of the sample of thirty-one participants was
fifty-one years (sd=9) and ranged from thirty-five to sixty-five years. The sample comprised
eighteen females and thirteen males. Of the group, twenty-four had suffered haemorrhagic
strokes and seven had experienced cerebral infarcts. The mean time since stroke was almost
fourteen months (sd=l8.8) and was found to range from three months to nine years. The
participant who had her stroke nine years earlier had been re-referred to rehabilitation
services due to anxiety. When her data was excluded the mean duration was ten months (sd
= 4.5 months) and ranged from three to nineteen months. The duration since stroke was
significantly different for this participant and it was therefore considered prudent to conduct
the analysis both with and without her data being included. In general the inclusion of this
participant's data did not significantly alter the overall findings. Any instance where the
results did differ as a result of her inclusion will be highlighted.
3:2 Distribution of data
The distribution of data was reviewed for each different pair of groups. In all analyses the
Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale (HAD) scores were found to be normally distributed
and parametric analyses were conducted. However, the Impact of Events (IES) scale data
was only found to be normally distributed when comparing the groups on the basis of sex,
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despite this parametric statistics have been used throughout. The reasons for this decision
were; it was assumed that the population from which the data was drawn would be normally
distributed and it was further assumed that parametric statistics would be robust enough to
withstand the degree of skewness and kurtosis found.
3:3 Primary hypotheses
Hypothesis One: It is hypothesised that a cerebrovascular accident can result in PTSD
as defined by DSM IV. It is predicted that PTSD will be present in this sample.
The results of this study suggest that it is possible to develop PTSD in response to stroke
and therefore the hypothesis is supported. In this sample of stroke patients (n=31), six were
diagnosed during interview as having Post-traumatic stress disorder. This is a prevalence of
19.4 per cent in this sample. This is higher than rates reported following other medical
events for example, 10 per cent following myocardial infarction (Bennett & Brooke 1999),
and is higher than the reported prevalence rate of 5-15 per cent in the general population
(Yule 1999). However, this finding is consistent with literature reporting prevalence of
PTSD in brain injured samples (Bryant et al 2000; Ohry et al 1996).
Hypothesis Two: It is hypothesised that loss of consciousness during cerebrovascular
accident does not prevent the development of PTSD. In this study it is predicted that
the participants who have both lost consciousness and developed PTSD would not be
equal to zero.
The findings of this study support the hypothesis as all six of the participants who developed
PTSD had lost consciousness at some point during the event. Chi-squared analysis was
carried out but as one cell was found to have less than five entries the Fisher's exact test is
quoted instead. There was no significant relationship between loss of consciousness and
PTSD, (Fisher's (1); p=0.14, two-tailed test), loss of consciousness and anxiety, (Fisher's
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(1); p=0.24, two-tailed test) or loss of consciousness and depression (Fisher's (1) ; p=l, two-
tailed test).
Table 1 shows the IES and HAD anxiety and depression scale scores for the 'loss of
consciousness group' (LOC) and 'no loss of consciousness' group (No LOC). The
participants who had lost consciousness had higher mean scores on all of the variables than
those who had not lost consciousness.
Table 1: IES and HAD scores for the 'loss of consciousness' (LOC) and 'no loss of consciousness'
(No LOC) groups.
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
LOC (n=21) 8.9 (7.8) 10.5(10.4)* 19.4(15.8)** 7.2 (4.6) 6.5 (4.2)
No LOC (n= 10) 4.2 (3.9) 3.8 (5.8)* 8 (8.6)** 5.4 (3.1) 5.7 (5.2)
m=mean, sd = standard deviation
* significantly different at p<.05 and ** significantly different at p<.01
Between-groups t-tests were used to analyse the differences between the groups. On the
measures of intrusions, anxiety and depression the mean scores did not differ significantly
between the groups. On the measure of avoidance, Levene's test for equality of variance
showed that the variances differed significantly between the groups (F=6.808; p=0.01) and a
Welch's t-test for unequal variances is quoted instead. The mean of the avoidance scores
for the 'loss of consciousness' group was found to be significantly higher, (t(28)= 2.301;
p=0.03, two-tailed test), than the 'no loss of consciousness' group. For analysis of total IES
score a t-test for unequal variances is again reported as the variances differed significantly
between the groups (Levene's test, F=4.891; p=0.035). The mean total IES score of the
'loss of consciousness' group was found to be significantly higher (t(28)=2.604; p=0.01,
two-tailed test) than the 'no loss of consciousness' group.
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All of those who developed PTSD had lost consciousness during the event. Furthermore,
the group who had lost consciousness scored significantly higher on avoidance and total
IES than the group who did not lose consciousness.
Hypothesis Three: It is hypothesised that following CVA memory of the event is not
required to develop PTSD. In this study it is predicted that the number of participants
who have no memory of the event and who also developed PTSD would not be equal to
zero.
As none of the eight participants who reported having no recall of the event had developed
PTSD hypothesis three was not supported. Furthermore, those with no recall of the event
were found to have lower scores on the Impact of Events scale and to have lower anxiety
scores (Table 2). A between-groups t-test was done. The variances of the two groups total
IES score were significantly unequal (F= 4.316; p< 0.05), and Welch's t-test for unequal
variances is reported accordingly. The mean for the total IES scores of the 'recall' group
was found to be significantly higher (t(25)= 2.08; p=0.048, two-tailed test) than the 'no
recall' group. However, when the data from the outlier was removed this difference was no
longer significant. The other scores were not found to differ significantly.
Table 2: IES and HAD scores for the 'recall' and 'no recall' groups.
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
Recall (n=23) 8.3 (7.9) 9.8(10.2) 18.1 (16.0)* 6.8 (4.6) 6.3 (4.2)
No recall (n=8) 4.8(3) 4.3 (6.30) 9(8)* 6(3.3) 6.3 (5.5)
m=mean, sd = standard deviation
* significantly different at p<.05
The group with recall of the event scored higher on intrusions, avoidance and total IES
than the group without recall. This difference was significant for the total IES score only
when the outlier was included. The mean scores of the two group on the measures of
anxiety and depression were similar.
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Hypothesis Four: It is hypothesised that PTSD will be diagnosed more in the group of
individuals who had right-sided lesions than in the group who had non right-sided
lesions.
To test this hypothesis two groups were defined by stroke location. The study participants
were grouped into those with a right-sided stroke and those who had stroke of 'other '
location which comprised left, bilateral and those without lateralisation. Table 3 (a) shows
the frequency of diagnosis for these two groups. Diagnosis of PTSD did not differ
significantly between these two groups (Fisher's (1); p= 0.653 two-tailed test). No
significant association was found between these groups on the occurrence of caseness for
anxiety (%2 (1) = 1.052, p=0.305, n=31) and no significant relationship was found between
diagnosis of depression and site of stroke (Fisher's (1); p=0.065, two-tailed test).
Table 3 (a): Percentage ofparticipants classified with PTSD, anxiety and depression grouped by site
ofstroke.
PTSD No PTSD Anxiety No anxiety Depression No depression
Right (n= 19) 16 84 32 68 53 47
Other (n= 12) 25 75 50 50 17 83
The group defined as having non right-sided strokes was found to have higher ratings than
the non right-sided group on the intrusions, avoidance and total IES scales as well as on the
HAD anxiety scale (Table 3 (b)). Using between-groups t-test none of these group
differences was found to be significant. The right-sided group scored higher (m= 7.8,
sd=4.5) on their ratings of depression on the HAD in comparison to the 'other' group (m=
3.8, sd=3.4). Further analysis found this difference to be significant (t(29)= 2.709; p=0.01,
two-tailed test) than the non right-sided stroke group.
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Table 3 (b): IES and HAD scoresfor the 'right sided stroke' and 'other' groups
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
Right (n=19) 6.6 (7.4) 7.1(8.2) 13.7(14.2) 6.4 (4.3) 7.8(4.5)*
Other (n=-12) 8.6 (6.8) 10.3(11.6) 18.9(15.8) 7 (4.3) 3.8(3.4)*
m= mean, sd = standard deviation
* significantly different at p<.05
Twenty-one participants were grouped according to whether their stroke involved anterior
cerebral arteries, middle cerebral arteries or posterior cerebral arteries. The remaining ten
could not be classified and so were excluded from this analysis. None of the differences
were found to be significant using Fisher's exact test. A one-way, between-subjects
Analysis of Variance was used to compare the differences across and within these three
groups on the HAD and IES and no significant differences were found to exist in this
sample.
There were no significant differences between the groups on diagnosis ofPTSD, anxiety or
depression. The group with non right-sided strokes scored higher on intrusions, avoidance,
total IES and anxiety, although the differences were not significant. The right-sided stroke
group did score significantly higher on depression. No difference was found between those
who had anterior, middle orposterior region strokes.
Hypothesis Five: It is hypothesised that following CVA participants will experience
less re-experiencing symptoms than avoidance or arousal symptoms.
The study considered whether PTSD symptoms reported by a stroke population are; a)
consistent with those defined by DSM-IV and b) indicative of a specific profile. Table 4 (a)
shows the numbers who met the individual DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. Although the
percentage diagnosed with PTSD in this sample was 19 per cent, the frequency with which
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some symptoms were endorsed was much higher for example, criterion B was met by 52 per
cent. The criteria B, C and D reflect the frequency with which symptoms were reported.
Forty per cent of the entire sample met all three criteria levels, only twenty-six per cent did
not meet any of them.
Table 4 (a): DSM-IV criteria met by participants.
DSM-IV Criteria A B C D E F
Met by (n) 8 16 16 19 31 6
% of sample 26 52 52 63 100 19
Table 4 (b) reports the frequency with which the 17 individual PTSD symptoms were
endorsed by the sample. This illustrates the profile of symptoms which were reported for
the entire sample and confirms the hypothesis that re-experiencing symptoms would be less
frequently reported than arousal and avoidance symptoms.
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Table 4 (b): PTSD symptoms endorsed by participants.









Distress at reminders 6















* indicates symptoms which could be endorsed due to brain injury rather than PTSD.
Figure one illustrates the similarities in the symptoms which were reported by the group
who were diagnosed with PTSD and those who did not meet the DSM IV criteria.
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FigureI:ComparisonftheSy ptomProfil sfhoswithandithoutTSDdia no e . DSMIVSymptoms
Bl=Intrusivethoughts B2=Nightmares B3=Recurring B4=Distressatreminder B5=Arousalatreminders
Cl=Avoidthoughts C2=Avoidactivities C3=an'trememberparofev nt C4=Diminishedinterest C5=Detached
C6= C7=
Affect Future
Dl=Sleepdisturbance D2=Anger D3=Concentration D4=Hypervigilant D5=HeightenedStartl
As shown in Figure 1 there are similarities in terms of the symptoms reported by both
groups. The symptoms which were not reported at similar levels by both groups were, (B3)
'feeling as though the event is recurring', (B4) 'distress at reminders', (C5) 'feeling
detached' and (C7) 'sense of a foreshortened future'. Post-hoc analysis was conducted to
see if the differences between the groups were significant on these symptoms.
Table 4 (c): Frequency ofsymptoms reported by PTSD and no PTSD groups.
PTSD No PTSD
symptom yes symptom no symptom yes symptom no
B3 6 0 6 19
B4 5 1 1 24
C5 5 1 7 18
C7 5 1 7 18
The PTSD and 'no PTSD' groups were found to differ significantly on the frequency with
which all of these symptoms were reported. For 'feeling that the event is recurring',
(Fisher's (1); p=0.001, two-tailed test), for 'distress at reminders' (Fisher's (1); p<0.001,
two-tailed test), for 'feeling detached' (Fisher's (1); p=0.022, two-tailed test) and 'sense of
foreshortened future', (Fisher's (1) ;p=0.022, two-tailed test).
Table 4 (d) shows the mean scores of the two groups on the IES and the HAD. A between-
subjects t-test was used to compare the PTSD and 'no PTSD' groups. Variances between
the groups were significantly unequal for total IES (F= 9.648; p= 0.004) and intrusions (F=
18.425; p< 0.000). Accordingly, analysis of the means of these two groups used Welch's t-
test for unequal variances. The groups were not found to differ significantly on intrusions or
total IES score. On the measure of avoidance the PTSD group was found to have scored
significantly higher (t(29)= 2.570; p=0.016, two-tailed test) than the 'no PTSD' group.
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The PTSD group also scored significantly higher on anxiety, (t(29)= 3.597; p=0.001, two-
tailed test) than the 'no PTSD' group. However, although the PTSD group scored higher on
depression than the 'no PTSD' group this difference was not found to be significant (t(29)=
1.598; p=0.121, two-tailed test).
Table 4 (d): IES and HAD scores for the 'PTSD' and 'no PTSD' groups.
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
PTSD (n=6) 13.5 (11.8) 16.7(13)* 30.2 (22) 11.3 (5)** 8.8 (4.4)
No PTSD (n=25) 5.9 (4.7) 6.4 (7.7)* 12.3 (10.5) 5.5(3.2)** 5.6 (4.4)
m= mean, sd = standard deviation
* significantly different at p<.05 and ** significantly different at p<.01
Almost 20 per cent of the sample were diagnosed as having PTSD. This increased to 48 per
cent when those who meet the criteria for subsyndromal PTSD were also included. Those
with PTSD reportedfour particular symptoms significantly more than those without PTSD.
The PTSD group scores higher on all variables with the differences being significant for
scores ofavoidance and anxiety.
3:4 Pearson Correlations
As PTSD is an anxiety disorder it was expected that there would be a significant correlation
between HAD anxiety and the IES sub-scales. Table 5 (a) show the correlation matrix of the
IES and HAD scores for those diagnosed with PTSD. Anxiety ratings on the HAD were not
found to significantly correlate with the Impact of Events and the correlation was only
slightly higher than that between the depression score and the IES. However, the intrusion
and avoidance scales were found to be significantly correlated. When the data for the entire
sample was used the IES and the anxiety scores were found to be significantly correlated
(table 5 (b)).
55
Table 5 (a): Correlations oflES andHAD scoresfor PTSD group.
Intrusions Avoidance IES Total Anxiety Depression
Intrusion 1.00
Avoidance 0.549 1.00
Total IES 0.868* 0.892* 1.00
Anxiety 0.290 0.370 0.377 1.00
Depression 0.153 0.143 0.168 0.939** 1.00
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Table 5 (b): Correlations ofIES and HAD scoresfor the entire sample.
Intrusions Avoidance IES Total Anxiety Depression
Intrusion 1.000
Avoidance 0.561** 1.000
Total IES 0.843** 0.918** 1.000
Anxiety 0.457** 0.488** 0.536** 1.000
Depression 0.298 0.262 0.312 0.488** 1.000
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Significant correlations were observed in those diagnosed with PTSD on their intrusion and
avoidance scores although no correlation was found with these and the anxiety scores.
However, for the entire sample the intrusions and avoidance scores correlated, as well as
both correlating with anxiety scores.
As the IES is a measure which has not been widely used with participants who have
experienced strokes, the scores for the PTSD group were compared with the published
norms for the IES scale (Horowitz et al 1979). A one sample t-test was used to compare the
scores. The groups were not found to differ significantly on intrusion scores (t(5)= 1.551;
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p>0.1, two-tailed test), avoidance scores (t(5)= 0.251; p>.01, two-tailed test) or total IES
score (t(5)= 1.045; p>0.1, two-tailed test). This appears to indicate that the sample who
developed PTSD following stroke reported similar levels of intrusions and avoidance as
Horowitz's sample. The results require cautious interpretation as the PTSD post-stroke
sample was very small and a retrospective power calculation suggest that the small sample
size of the stroke group reduced the power of the study. The effect sizes were 0.8, 0.1 and
0.5 respectively. The sample size required for these effect sizes to give power of 0.80 would
have been 25 to assess intrusions, >1000 to test avoidance and 60 to test the total score.
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3:5 Post Hoc Analysis
Additional analysis was conducted post-hoc to consider the effect of the following variables
on reported symptoms of PTSD, anxiety and depression; 1) type of stroke; 2) sex; 3)
duration of post-traumatic amnesia and 4) exposure to previous trauma.
1. Type of stroke
The sample was separated into groups defined by type of stroke, one group of haemorrhagic
stroke participants (n=24) and one of ischaemic stroke (n=7) participants. Only one of the
ischaemic stroke group developed PTSD compared with five of the haemorrhagic group
although this difference was not significant (Fisher's (1) p=0.59, two-tailed test). The
haemorrhagic group was found to have higher scores on both sub-scales of the IES and on
HAD anxiety, but was found to have lower scores on depression, than the ischaemic group
(Table 6). However, when the data from the outlier was excluded the avoidance scores were
lower for the haemorrhagic group. Analysis using a between-subjects t-test indicated that
the groups did not differ significantly on these measures.
Table 6: IES and HAD scoresfor the two groups defined by type ofstroke.
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) ill (sd)
Ischaemic (n=7) 5.6 (5) 8 (8.4) 13.6(11.6) 5.6 (2.7) 7.7 (4.2)
Haemorrhagic (n=24) 7.9 (7.5) 8.5 (10.1) 16.4(15.8) 6.9 (4.6) 5.8 (4.6)
m= mean, sd = standard deviation
The groups did not differ significantly on IES and HAD scores although the haemorrhagic
group scored higher on avoidance, intrusions and anxiety. The haemorrhagic stroke
patients reported less depression than the ischaemic stroke group.
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2. Sex differences
More women were found to have developed PTSD, to have become anxious and to have
become depressed than men post-stroke (Table 7 (a)). A Fisher's exact test was used to
compare the incidence of psychological distress in the two groups. The results were non¬
significant for PTSD, (Fisher's (1); p= 0.36, two-tailed test), and depression, (Fisher's (1);
p= 0.48, two-tailed test). But were found to be significant for anxiety, (Fisher's (1); p=0.03,
two-tailed test).
Table 7 (a): Percentage of female and male participants classified with PTSD, anxiety and
depression.
No No No
PTSD PTSD Anxiety anxiety Depression depression
Female (n = 18) 28 72 56 44 44 56
Male (n=13) 8 92 15 85 31 69
Furthermore, the female group were found to have higher mean scores on the Impact of
Events scale, the anxiety scale and the depression scale (Table 7 (b)). Between-groups t-
tests were used to analyse the data. On the HAD anxiety scale, the mean score for the
female group was found to be significantly higher (t(29)= 2.295; p=0.03, two-tailed test)
than the mean score of the male group. The other scores were not found to differ
significantly.
Table 7 (b): IES and PIAD scores for the two groups defined by sex.
Intrusions Avoidance IES Total Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
Female (n=18) 8.9(8.3) 10.6 (11.2) 19.5 (17.1) 8 (4.7)* 7.6 (4.4)
Male (n=13) 5.2 (4.4) 5.3 (6.1) 10.5 (9.1) 4.7 (2.6)* 4.5 (4.1)
m= mean, sd = standard deviation
* significantly different at p<.05
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More ofthefemale group were diagnosed as having PTSD, anxiety and depression than the
males. They also scored significantly higher on the anxiety measure.
3. Severity of injury
Relationship between duration ofPTA and prevalence of PTSD, anxiety and depression was
considered. The sample was separated into those with PTA of more, and less than seven
days duration. These two groups were compared on frequency of diagnosis for PTSD,
anxiety and depression (Table 8 (a)). For anxiety there was no significant difference
between the two groups, (Fisher's (1); p=0.274, two-tailed test) and neither was there a
significant difference on frequency of depression, (Fisher's (1); p=0.717, two-tailed test).
But the groups were found to be significantly different on frequency of PTSD, (Fisher's (1);
p=0.037, one-tailed test) with the group with longer post-traumatic amnesia having
significantly higher diagnosis of PTSD. However, although this difference was not
significant at the two-tailed level, (Fisher's (1); p=0.059, two-tailed level) it is approaching
significance.
Table 8 (a): Percentage ofparticipants with PTSD, anxiety and depression grouped by duration of
post-traumatic amnesia.
PTSD No Anxiety No Depression No
PTSD anxiety depression
PTA < 7 days 0 100 25 75 33 67
(n=12)
PTA>7 days 32 68 47 53 42 58
(n=19)
The group with longer duration ofPTA scored higher on all variables and the IES and HAD
scores for the two groups were analysed using a between-groups t-test. The groups were not
found to differ significantly on any variable (Table 8 (b)).
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Table 8 (b): IES andHAD scores for the two groups defined by duration ofPTA.
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
PTA < 7 days 5.8(5.5) 4.9 (8.1) 10.7(11.5) 5.4 (3.3) 6(3.8)
(n=12)
PTA > 7 days 8.4 (7.9) 10.5 (10.0) 19(16) 7.3 (4.7) 6.4 (5.0)
(n=19)
m= mean, sd = standard deviation
The group with longer PTA was found to have more participants diagnosed with PTSD than
the shorter PTA group. They also scored higher on all measures although not significantly
so.
4. Previous trauma experience
The sample was separated into two groups depending on whether participants had reported a
previous history of a traumatic event. Table 9(a) shows frequency of diagnosis of PTSD,
anxiety and depression. The groups were compared using Fisher's exact test and the group
of participants who had reported previous trauma history had significantly higher frequency
of depression following their stroke, (Fisher's (1); p=0.05, one-tailed test). Although this
was not significant at the two-tailed level, (Fisher's (1); p=0.06, two-tailed test). However,
when the data for the outlier was removed this result was significant using a two-tailed test.
The results were non-significant for PTSD, (Fisher's (1); p= 0.65, two-tailed test) and
anxiety, (Fisher's (1); p=0.717, two-tailed test).








Previous trauma 25 75 33 67 17 83
(n= 12)
No previous 16 84 42 58 53 47
trauma (n= 19)
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Table 9 (b) shows the mean scores of these two groups for IES, anxiety and depression.
Analysis was conducted using between-subjects t-tests and indicated that the groups did not
differ significantly on any of the variables.
Table 9 (b): IES andHAD scores for the two groups defined byprevious trauma experience.
Intrusions Avoidance Total IES Anxiety Depression
m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd) m (sd)
Previous trauma 9.3 (9.3) 8.6 (9) 17.9(17.3) 6.7 (4) 5.1 (3.6)
(n=12)
No previous trauma 6.2 (5.1) 8.2(10.2) 14.4(13.3) 6.6 (4.5) 7.00 (4.9)
(n=19)
m= mean, sd = standard deviation
Participants in the group who reportedprevious experience of trauma were more frequently
diagnosed with depression than those who did not reportprevious experience of trauma.
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3:6 Summary of Key Results
Symptoms reported after stroke are consistent with those which define PTSD. Furthermore,
they were not only reported by those who were diagnosed with PTSD. In this sample of
stroke patients the prevalence of PTSD was 19.4 per cent which suggests it is possible for
stroke to precipitate PTSD. The numbers who could be classified as subsyndromal are
closer to 50 per cent. The PTSD group scored higher on all variables with the scores
differing significantly on ratings of avoidance and anxiety. A key finding was that the
PTSD group reported DSM IV symptoms which are not confounded by brain significantly
more than the 'no PTSD' group. This suggests a way of distinguishing PTSD from non
PTSD in brain injured populations.
The results also indicate the requirement for further investigation into the role type of stroke
might have on post-stroke symptoms as only one of the participants in this study diagnosed
with PTSD had experienced an ischaemic stroke compared to five from the group who had
experienced haemorrhagic strokes. However no definite conclusions can be drawn due to
the unequal group sizes. On self-report measures of anxiety and symptoms of PTSD, the
haemorrhagic group scored higher than the ischaemic stroke group although the differences
were not significant. The ischaemic group scored higher depression although again this
was not a significant finding. However, the variable of depression was found to be
influenced by the outlier's score.
The group with longer post-traumatic amnesia was found to have significantly higher rates
of diagnosis of PTSD suggesting that PTSD could be associated with severity of injury. The
more severely injured group were also found to score higher on all variables than the less
severely injured group.
All of the participants who developed PTSD had lost consciousness at some point during the
event which suggests that in some circumstances loss of consciousness does not preclude
development of PTSD. Furthermore, those who had lost consciousness reported higher
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scores on anxiety, depression and the Impact of Events Scale. This difference was
significant for total IES and on the avoidance sub-scale. All of the participants who
developed PTSD had recall of the event. Furthermore, recall of the event was associated
with higher levels of psychological distress as measured by the IES and the HAD. Those
who had recall of the event scored significantly higher on total Impact of Events.
The prevalence with which anxiety, PTSD and depression were diagnosed was not found to
be related to site of stroke. However, the right-sided stroke group scored significantly
higher on the HAD depression scale than the 'other' group. This finding could be even
more significant as the non right group had higher ratings on all of the other variables. No
significant differences were found when groups were defined by the cerebral artery
disrupted during stroke and compared on frequency of caseness or degree of symptoms
reported. Female participants were found to be more anxious and depressed as well as being
more likely to have developed post-stroke PTSD. The mean female score on the anxiety
sub-scale of the HAD was found to be significantly higher than the mean score of the male
group. The group who had reported a previous trauma scored higher on intrusions,
avoidance, total IES and anxiety although this was not significant. The previous trauma
group also appeared to have more caseness levels of depression post-stroke, although this
result was only significant at the one-tail level except when the outlier's data was removed.
For those who were diagnosed with PTSD, the sub-scales of the IES were significantly
correlated. The IES scores only had a slightly higher correlation with the HAD anxiety
scale than with the HAD depression scale, neither of which were found to be significant.
Although, Impact of Events scores correlated significantly with anxiety when the data for





Hypothesis One: It is hypothesised that a cerebrovascular accident can result in PTSD as
defined by DSM IV. It is predicted that PTSD will be present in this sample.
Hypothesis Two: It is hypothesised that loss of consciousness during cerebrovascular
accident does not prevent the development of PTSD. In this study it is predicted that the
participants who have both lost consciousness and developed PTSD would not be equal to
zero.
Hypothesis Three: It is hypothesised that following CVA memory of the event is not
required to develop PTSD. In this study it is predicted that the number of participants who
have no memory of the event and who also developed PTSD would not be equal to zero.
Hypothesis Four: It is hypothesised that PTSD will be diagnosed more in the group of
individuals who had right-sided lesions than in the group who had non right-sided lesions.
Hypothesis Five: It is hypothesised that following CVA participants will experience less re-
experiencing symptoms than avoidance or arousal symptoms.
4:1 Prevalence
It could be concluded from the results of this study, that it is possible for some individuals
who have experienced a stroke, to develop Post-traumatic stress disorder. In this sample of
31 stroke patients, PTSD was diagnosed, by interview in six cases, at a prevalence rate of
almost 20 per cent. This rate is high when compared with prevalence of 23 per cent reported
in prisoners of war (Solomon et al, 1994) and 33 per cent found in a group of the injured
survivors of a terrorist attack (Shalev, 1992). The prevalence rate found in this study does
differ from those reported by other investigations into post-stroke PTSD for example, 32 per
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cent reported by Berry (1998) and 10 per cent reported by Sembi et al (1998). Some of the
issues which might have influenced the reliability of the prevalence rate will be discussed.
The prevalence rate reported here could have been influenced by the time since the event.
Sbordone, (1999) reports that the DSM-IV predicts that 50 per cent of cases will resolve
within three months of the event without any intervention. This conclusion has been
supported by studies including that of Schnyder et al, (2001) who reported a 3 per cent
reduction in the prevalence rate of their sample over a twelve month period and that of
Solomon et al, (1994) who reported that their prevalence rate reduced by 10 per cent over a
twenty year time period. As the mean time since stroke in the current study was fourteen
months, it is possible that in this sample the prevalence rate reflects chronic cases.
However, although it is possible that time since injury could have reduced the reliability of
this study's findings, other studies of brain injured participants have concluded that time
since injury was not related to reports of psychological distress (Turnbull et al, 2001).
Sembi et al, (1998) reported finding no relationship between the time since injury and PTSD
in their sample of stroke patients. However, their group was assessed a maximum of 18
months post event, whereas in the current study the time since stroke ranged from three
months to nine years. Unfortunately, Berry (1998) did not report time since injury so it is
difficult to ascertain whether this could explain the variation in prevalence rates between
hers and the current study. During the interviews for the current study, a number of
participants made comments which led the researcher to believe that prevalence might have
been higher if people had been interviewed closer to the event. Although this could be
considered to be a limitation of the study it suggests that psychological distress post-stroke
is not exclusively limited to the acute stages of recovery.
The revision of DSM IV criterion A for PTSD makes comparison with other studies difficult
and may have contributed to an underestimation of PTSD in this stroke sample. The current
66
criterion A stipulates that the individual's response must involve 'horror, fear or
helplessness'. This could be considered more restrictive than the DSM II1-R definition
which was:-
event outside the range of usual human experience... and that would be markedly
distressing to almost anyone" (DSM III-R, 1987 p247).
A number of research studies continue to use DSM III-R criteria (e.g. Berry 1998; Brewin et
al 1999). As the study reported by Berry and the present study had similar sample
composition and size, her use of DSM III-R criterion could account for her study's higher
prevalence rates. This is further supported by the finding in the current sample, that only
eight participants met criterion A which suggests that the DSM III-R definition could be
more appropriate with stroke patients. One possible explanation for the reduced fear and
helplessness reported by stroke patients, is a reduced awareness that the symptoms being
experienced were representative of having a stroke. Some stroke patients might have been
unaware that they were having a stroke, for example one of the participants in this study
attributed his symptoms to flu and did not contact his GP until two days after the event.
The view that PTSD is a continuum also suggests that the 20 per cent prevalence might be
an underestimate. Schnyder et al, (2001) found subsyndromal PTSD prevalence of 21 per
cent at their initial point of assessment and 13 per cent twelve months later. In the current
study, on considering each DSM criterion separately they were found to be endorsed by
more than double the participants that were diagnosed as having PTSD. Using Schnyder et
al's definition of subsyndromal PTSD would give a prevalence rate of 48 per cent for those
diagnosed with full or partial PTSD. Sembi et al, (1998) also found that symptoms
consistent with PTSD were reported frequently in those participants who did not meet full
diagnostic criteria. It is important to consider those who fall below the diagnostic threshold
because some authors argue that subsyndromal levels can develop into clinical levels
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through a positive feedback loop which strengthens the conditioned fear response (Pitman
1989).
Diagnostic factors could have influenced the prevalence rate in this study in two ways.
Firstly, the author made all of the diagnoses and it was not possible to have the validity of
these confirmed during the project. However, the author is familiar with diagnosis of PTSD
and self-report measures were used in addition to the semi-structured interview. Secondly,
it is easy to overestimate PTSD in a brain injured population by not taking into account the
endorsement of symptoms which could be attributed to the brain injury. In this study, the
most frequently endorsed symptoms were impaired concentration and lack of recall of the
event both of which could be related to brain injury. Although, with a stroke population
presentation is not confounded by post-concussional symptoms the consequences of brain
injury cannot be dismissed as having no contribution to symptoms. Despite this, symptoms
which could not be attributed to brain injury, but which are consistent with PTSD, were also
frequently reported.
4:2 Presentation of post-stroke PTSD.
Hypothesis five predicted that re-experiencing symptoms would be less frequently reported
than avoidance or arousal symptoms. The hypothesis was supported as the most frequently
met criteria was the arousal criterion met by 63 per cent of the entire sample although re-
experiencing and avoidance were met equally by 52 per cent. However, comparing the
numbers who endorsed the criteria can give a slightly false impression of the frequency with
which symptoms were reported as each of the diagnostic criteria (B,C and D) require a
different number of items to be endorsed within each, to say that criteria has been met.
When the symptoms reported by the entire sample were considered, hypothesis five was
more strongly supported. The most frequently endorsed symptoms were the arousal
symptoms and the least frequently endorsed were the re-experiencing symptoms.
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Comparison of the PTSD and non-PTSD groups found a difference in reported symptoms as
the PTSD group endorsed arousal symptoms most frequently while the non-PTSD group
reported avoidance symptoms most frequently. Neither group reported having nightmares
and very few reported intrusive and distressing recollections or numbness of affect. Aside
from the symptoms which could be attributed to brain injury the most frequently endorsed
for those diagnosed with PTSD were; 'feeling as though the event was recurring'; 'sense of
foreshortened future'; 'feeling detached' and 'distress on exposure to reminders'. A key
finding of the study was that these symptoms could be used to distinguish patients who are
more likely to develop chronic PTSD as analysis showed that the groups differed
significantly in terms of the frequency with which these symptoms were reported. Given
that psychological resources are limited in the area of stroke rehabilitation, it could be that if
patients report any of these symptoms it is taken as an indication that more assessment and
monitoring of their mood might be required.
As there was a virtual absence of nightmares and intrusions it could be questioned whether
the symptom profile was PTSD. However, different profiles are consistent with general
trauma research. Studies comparing participants who have been exposed to different
traumatic experiences have found that certain symptom patterns might be associated with
particular types of trauma. For example, combat survivors have been found to report
intrusive symptoms more than avoidance (Solomon et al, 1994). This has lead some authors
to conclude that it is more useful to consider PTSD as having distinct clinical typologies
(Alarcon et al, 1997). It could be that brain injury is associated with a particular clinical
typology as the symptoms presented by participants in this study are consistent with the
clinical subtype described by Alarcon et al (1997) as the "neurotic" subtype with the
predominant symptoms being anxiety, hyperarousal and avoidance.
The present study confirms that the post-stroke PTSD profile is consistent with that found in
other brain injured populations where the least endorsed are the re-experiencing symptoms
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of criterion B (Bryant et al, 2000). In brain injured populations the reduced incidence of re-
experiencing symptoms is often attributed to the absence of memory for the event.
However, in this study only eight people had no recall of the event but they still experienced
both intrusive and avoidance symptoms. This suggests that despite having no memory the
experience was still re-experienced. Bennett & Brooke (1999), reported that increased
intrusions were associated with awareness during the event. In this sample, people reported
being unaware that they were having a stroke and this could, in conjunction with having less
fear, have contributed to less re-experiencing.
The predominant symptoms in this sample of heightened arousal and avoidance appeared to
be associated with particular cognitive themes. The themes which emerged were similar to
those found in the general PTSD population while also reflecting specific concerns of this
population. A number of the participants were preoccupied with the fear that they could
have another stroke. This finding was also reflected in Berry's (1998) sample. She reported
that patients tended to misinterpret normal physiological changes as indicating another
stroke. This is consistent with current understanding of PTSD as individuals who have
experienced trauma over-estimate the risk of another traumatic event occurring (Yule 1999).
Participants also made comments that they had accepted that the event could recur or that
they had come to terms with their own mortality. This may reflect that for some, the
experience had been assimilated and they were able to resume their life accepting the
presence of a degree of risk.
Being preoccupied with 'missing time' was another theme which emerged and which is also
consistent with other PTSD populations. PTSD in the general population can be
accompanied by an inability to remember part of the event. This can create distress as the
individual gradually fills in the gaps and constructs an accurate narrative of the event they
have been through. In all cases of brain injury there will be an absence of memory. This
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means lack of recall, contrary to the widely held belief, might not provide protection from
PTSD but might exacerbate features of it.
In the general population, PTSD is categorised as one of the anxiety disorders and in this
study the participants with PTSD were found to be more anxious than those not diagnosed
with PTSD. Despite this, the IES scores of those diagnosed with PTSD were not found to
correlate with their scores on the anxiety sub-scale of the HAD, a finding which would be
considered atypical. However, when data for the entire sample were included anxiety
correlated highly with the IES scale. This suggest the anomalous finding in the PTSD group
might be a reflection of the small sample size.
A further finding was that the group with PTSD reported more depression than the non-
PTSD group although issues relating to guilt and grief were noted during interviews with
participants from both groups. These findings are similar to those reported by Sembi et al,
(1998) who found a highly significant difference between their PTSD and no PTSD groups
on anxiety and depression scores. Furthermore, there was a strong correlation between the
HAD anxiety and depression scales for both the PTSD group and the entire group. This
high level of co-morbid anxiety and depression could reflect chronic distress in this group
and might be related to disability. There was no correlation found between intrusions,
avoidance and depression, a finding which had been reported in the stroke sample assessed
by Sembi et al, (1998). However, it is unclear whether those correlations were for only for
participants diagnosed with PTSD or the entire sample which means an accurate comparison
of these findings is not possible.
4:3 Type of stroke
Five out of the six participants diagnosed with PTSD had haemorrhagic brain injuries.
Although the groups sizes were unequal this finding has identified an area which would
benefit from further investigation in subsequent studies. In her study, Berry (1998) reported
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a PTSD prevalence rate of 32 per cent, in a sample comprised of participants who had
experienced haemorrhagic strokes. Sembi et al, (1998) reported only 10 per cent prevalence
in a sample comprised mainly of participants who had cerebral infarcts. The difference in
the reported prevalence rates in these studies suggests that the type of stroke might influence
prevalence of PTSD. A higher prevalence of PTSD following sub-arachnoid haemorrhage
could be explained by the sudden symptoms which accompany it, or the invasive medical
procedures which often follow it. However the findings of the present study were that the
two groups did not differ significantly in terms of reported psychological distress and the
haemorrhagic group scored only slightly higher on the IES and the HAD anxiety scale than
the infarct group. In terms of the frequency of PTSD diagnosis in the groups, 21 per cent of
the haemorrhagic sample developed PTSD compared with 14 per cent of the infarct sample
although this difference was not found to be significant. However these findings have to be
interpreted cautiously due to the small and unequal sample sizes and further research is
required to explore whether type of stroke has any role in development of PTSD.
Levels of both anxiety and depression were found to be high in this sample. Using the
recommended cut-off, 39 per cent of the total sample met caseness for anxiety and the same
for depression (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). A small number of the participants were
receiving anti-depressant medication or were still in contact with rehabilitation services
although the majority were not. These high levels of anxiety and depression are similar to
those reported by Berry (1998) who found anxiety in 50 per cent of her sample. However, a
39 per cent prevalence rate of anxiety and depression is higher than the levels reported by
both Sembi et al, (1998) and Sharpe et al, (1990) who reported prevalence rates of 10 per
cent and 14 per cent respectively.
72
4:4 Impact of loss of consciousness & memory on psychological distress post-stroke.
One of the important findings of this study was that all of those individuals who developed
PTSD had lost consciousness at some point during the event. The conclusion which can be
drawn from this is that loss of consciousness per se does not always protect the individual
from developing PTSD and therefore hypothesis two was supported. However, it may be
that an absence of memory of the event, for some, does reduce the degree of psychological
distress thus explaining the lower levels of PTSD found in some other studies (e.g. Bryant &
Harvey 2000). The consequence of this for clinicians is that it cannot be assumed that
because the event also involved a brain injury that the occurrence of co-morbid PSTD can
be excluded. The finding that PTSD was more common in the study participants who had
definitely lost consciousness appears surprising although it is consistent with other reports
(Mayou et al, 2000).
Loss of consciousness was also associated with higher levels of psychological distress on all
of the measures. Although those with no recall of the event had lower intrusions and
avoidance scores than those with recall, both types of symptoms were still reported.
Hypothesis three could not be supported but the findings do suggests that memory is not
required to traumatically re-experience the event. This was also reported by Turnbull et al,
(2001) who concluded that those with traumatic memories scored similarly on the IES to
those with no memory of the event, and both of these groups scored higher than the group
with non-traumatic recall. This could suggest that for some the absence of recall might be
more distressing than having recall of a traumatic event which can eventually be assimilated
into pre-existing belief structures. In this study, participants comments reflected two
different coping strategies. Some participants said that having no memory made the event
easier to deal with while others reported finding the gap distressing. Horowitz's 1986 (as
cited in Yule 1999) model of trauma was based on the concept that following trauma the
individual goes through a process in which the traumatic experience is integrated into their
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pre-existing schema the 'completion tendency'. This process would be interrupted if there
is lack ofmemory which means the event is not emotionally processed.
In the current study, the difference in scores between the group who lost consciousness and
those who did not was found to be significant for total IES scores and avoidance. This
finding could reflect either that intrusions scores were low in both groups or that avoidance
was higher in the group who had lost consciousness. Low intrusions scores would be
consistent with the view that the brain injury disrupts encoding and memory of the event,
resulting in less re-experiencing symptoms being reported (Bryant et al 2000). When data
for the entire sample was considered, the few re-experiencing symptoms reported were those
of re-experiencing through psychological and physiological distress rather than intrusive
thoughts or nightmares. However, they were reported more by those who had lost
consciousness and there are a number of possible explanations for this. Firstly, the content
of the intrusions might not have been related to the experience of stroke. Secondly, a
number of participants were distressed by the time which they had 'lost' due to loss of
consciousness. It is possible that having no memory of the event resulted in attempts to fill
in the missing period. Due to the preoccupation with the gap in their memory they might
have become more likely to 're-experience' the event.
The finding of higher avoidance in the loss of consciousness group is very interesting as, if
there is no memory, the function of avoidance may not to be the same as that in non-brain
injured samples. It has also been reported by other studies, e.g. Bryant et al, (2000) reported
high levels of avoidance in a sample of severely brain injured patients with PTSD.
Furthermore, in the present study although less so than intrusions, avoidance was still
reported by those without recall. This finding is contrary to the widely held belief expressed
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by O'Brien & Nutt (1998) as:-
" the lack ofmemory means that there is less reason to avoid the relevant cues to the
event and this probably results in less avoidance" (O'Brien & Nutt 1998 pi 02).
There are plausible explanations as to why avoidance might be higher in a group who lost
consciousness during the event and these are again related to the absence of recall. It is
possible that avoidance occurs due to the heightened fear of stroke recurring. If there is a
belief that the stroke could have been prevented then there may be a sense that by avoiding
particular events and activities that the likelihood of it happening again is reduced.
Furthermore, the loss of consciousness group might not be avoiding reminders of the stroke
itself but another event which was traumatic, for example, having been told about the event.
A number of those who participated in the study described having been told after the event
that they had nearly died or that their families had thought they might die. This was
distressing for them as they were unable to remember the event and they had difficulty
accepting the fact that they could have died and had no awareness that they had been so ill.
Information given after the event has been found by others to be associated with significant
distress (e.g. McNeil & Greenwood, 1996). For some participants their behaviour after they
had regained consciousness became a source of embarrassment to them and avoidance might
have been a means of coping with this. This is likely as the coping strategies available to
brain-injured patients may be less sophisticated. Instances were described by participants of
them having been told by family members that they had behaved in very uncharacteristic
and disinhibited ways, which made them feel uncomfortable and embarrassed. Although
this behaviour is not uncommon post-brain injury (Lezak 1995), and despite being given
reassurance, some of the participants reported finding knowledge of how they behaved to be
very distressing. The implications of these findings are that giving greater consideration to
how and when, information is given to individuals who have been unconscious might result
in reduced distress for those concerned.
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As the participants who had lost consciousness during the event were combined with those
who lost consciousness subsequent to it to make the 'loss of consciousness' group, it could
be said that those who had higher symptoms were the participants who had not lost
consciousness until after the event. However, this is unlikely to explain these results as
memory encoding and storage would be disrupted regardless of the point at which loss of
consciousness occurred.
Furthermore, levels of avoidance might have been underestimated in this study as it is
difficult to measure avoidance accurately in a sample who are receiving regular
rehabilitation sessions. In receiving rehabilitation patients, are being frequently reminded of
the event and would be unable to avoid reminders. O'Carroll et al, (1999) proposed that low
prevalence of PTSD following variceal haemorrhage was the result of an inability to avoid
reminders of the event. For the majority of participants in their study the traumatic event
had occurred at home and as a result participants were de-sensitised to reminders. It is
possible that the participants in this study demonstrated less avoidance than they might have
if they had not been involved with rehabilitation services.
4:5 Psychological distress and location of stroke.
In investigating the relationship between location of stroke and PTSD this study found that
the group with right-sided lesions did not differ significantly from the 'other' group on
diagnosis of PTSD or caseness of anxiety. Although this means that hypothesis four is not
supported this conclusion could be considered unreliable due to the study only including
patients who were not dysphasic. This meant that participants with right hemisphere strokes
were over-represented while those in the 'other' category represented strokes which has
disrupted areas not associated with language. The right hemisphere lesion group were found
to have lower Impact of Events scores although this difference was not significant. The
association between right hemisphere and PTSD remains unclear with some authors
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reporting that right-sided lesions are associated with an increase in intrusive re-experiencing
(e.g. Berthier et al 2001) while others reporting that right hemisphere lesions 'cured'
intrusive re-experiencing (e.g. Freeman & Kimbrell 2000).
The sample was also grouped into those who had strokes related to anterior cerebral arteries,
middle cerebral arteries and posterior arteries. Of the six with anterior artery disruption,
only one instance of caseness emerged and this was of anxiety. Of the seven with middle
artery disruption one had PTSD, three had anxiety and four were depressed. Of those with
posterior disruption two had PTSD, five were anxious and three had depression. The trend
appeared to suggest that when anterior sites are affected it results in least amount of
psychological distress. This could be considered consistent with Freeman & Kimbrell's
(2000) finding that that right frontal damage reduced intrusive symptoms of PTSD.
However, this could also reflect a trend in reporting of symptoms. This study relied solely
on self-report data to assess presence of psychological distress and had received no
collateral information. It is not uncommon for individuals with anterior lesions to have
limited insight into their difficulties (Lezak, 1995). It may be that the group with anterior
lesions were found to have less psychological distress because they do not recognise or
report their symptoms.
Conclusions drawn from data which suggests relationships between lesion location and
psychological symptoms should be tentative particularly as information from scans can be
unreliable and because lesions can have wide ranging effects. In previous reports, post-
stroke depression has been associated with left anterior strokes (Starkstein & Robinson,
1989) although later community based studies have found no relationship to exist. (Sharpe
et al, 1990). A recent review paper examining the existing research on lesion location and
depression concluded that the prevalence of depression was slightly higher in right-sided
stroke patients (Carson et al, 2000). This was also the finding of the current study as the
participants who had right-sided strokes were more often diagnosed with caseness levels of
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depression and they scored significantly higher on the HAD depression scale. This finding
suggests that current conclusions regarding the association between lesions and mood
disorders are tenuous. Furthermore, Carson et al (2000) highlight a methodological flaw
which makes data relating to location of stroke lesion and mood disorder unreliable. The
majority of studies use samples which exclude dysphasic patients. In the present study one
of the exclusion criteria was that participants should not be dysphasic. This criteria was
used because the measures used for data collection would have required adaptation to allow
assessment of patients with dysphasia. As dysphasia is more usually associated with left-
sided lesions this suggests a possible confounding variable as the majority of people
included would have had lesions associated with specific areas which are not directly
involved in language function. There may be benefits in highlighting the influence of lesion
location in PTSD as there could be implications for interventions which rely heavily on left
hemisphere language centers.
4:6 Relationship between severity of injury and psychological distress
The more severely injured of this sample experienced more psychological distress. In
particular, those with longer PTA were found to have significantly higher diagnosis of
PTSD as well as having more instances of depression and anxiety. There was also a trend
towards the more severely injured having higher scores on intrusions, avoidance, anxiety
and depression. This is consistent with the proposed existence of alternative mechanisms by
which traumatically brain injured individuals are believed to acquire 'memory' of the event.
In this group, despite long PTA some of the traumatic event might have been encoded either
implicitly or prior to losing consciousness (King 1997a). The participant in the current
study who had the longest PTA recounted a clear memory of having her haemorrhage and of
traveling to hospital before she lost consciousness. The conclusion from these results is that
longer periods of disrupted consciousness do not necessarily 'protect' the individual from
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subsequent psychological distress. This is especially the case post-stroke as the traumatic
event is not restricted to the experience of having the stroke. The individual regains
consciousness to find that they have nearly died, that they have acquired, often a significant
and life-changing disability, and that their 'life plan' has been turned upside down. For
some, the process of regaining consciousness and becoming aware of the implications of the
event will have been an additional traumatic experience.
4:7 Influence of sex on symptoms
The female participants were found to have more PTSD, anxiety and depression than the
male participants. Their scores on the IES and HAD were consistently higher than the male
participants. There has been little research examining sex differences in post brain injury
mood disorders, perhaps because brain injured samples are predominantly male. However,
the study by Ohry et al (1996) also reported a similar sex difference in post injuiy PTSD
including significant differences in the symptoms reported by men and women. Males
reported significantly more 'distress at reminders' and 'avoidance of thoughts and feelings',
whereas women reported more 'restricted affect'. In the present study when the symptoms
profiles were compared it was found that the female participants had reported more 'feeling
as though the event was recurring' and 'sleep disturbance' (see Appendix 7). The frequency
with which the other symptoms were reported was not found to differ.
Rather than reflecting a difference between the sexes in adjustment to trauma, the findings
could represent a reluctance by men to acknowledge psychological distress. During the
interviews, male participants seemed more reluctant to discuss the emotional impact of their
stroke and were more likely to be dismissive of the emotional sequelae. They made more
comments which indicated a preoccupation with the period of time they could not remember
and of their desire to obtain an explanation as to why they had experienced a stroke.
Although it is important to be cautious in interpreting the findings from what was a
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relatively small sample, the results were consistent with a number of other studies (Schnyder
et al, 2001; Brewin et al, 1999; Ohry et al, 1996).
In the general population women are more likely to develop PTSD than men (Andrews et al,
1994). This suggests that although women are often not represented in traumatically brain
injured samples, their reactions to the experience might be more severe. In stroke, men and
women are equally represented and this is one reason why conclusions from brain injury
research might not be entirely applicable to a stroke population.
4:8 Does previous trauma increase likelihood of post-stroke PTSD?
In this study, previous trauma was not found to be associated with diagnosis of PTSD post-
stroke. It was however, found to be associated with post-stroke depression. In the general
population exposure to trauma is thought to increase the risk of developing PTSD when
faced with subsequent stressors (Yule 1999). The finding of this study did not support this
in a stroke population but there are a number of issues to consider. The time which had
elapsed between the previous stressor and the stroke was unknown and could have
influenced the impact of the index traumatic event. In addition, time constraints during the
interview did not allow a detailed trauma history to be taken which would have contributed
more information about reaction to and frequency of, previous trauma.
Although this finding is not consistent with the general trauma literature it is consistent with
PTSD post-stroke. Sembi et al, (1998) found no significant difference in reports of previous
adverse life events, when comparing those who did and did not develop PTSD. They did
find that pre-morbid psychopathology was a better predictor of psychopathology post-stroke
than the individual's cognitive appraisal of the trauma. The reliability of the current study's
conclusions could have been enhanced by assessing premorbid levels of psychopathology.
The findings in relation to previous trauma and depression are confounded by the degree of
physical and cognitive impairment resulting from the stroke. A link between functional
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disability post-stroke and depression has been observed. This relationship is not reported as
being causal but one in which disability impairs functioning and recovery by maintaining
depression (Eastwood et al 1989; Starkstein & Robinson 1989). Exploring the cognitions
which were associated with depression in this sample could have contributed to our
understanding of the impact of both previous trauma and disability. Drawing from general
trauma literature, one hypothesis is that those who had experienced previous trauma could
have developed a sense of vulnerability and powerlessness. Both of which could be
reinforced by disability and culminating in chronic depression.
4:9 Study Limitations
4:9:1 Sample
The study sample was representative of the type of strokes that can occur despite being
small in size. Although it was predominantly comprised of haemorrhagic stroke participants
this was not because patients with infarcts were unavailable or unwilling but was instead
due to difficulties in accessing this group. The main difficulty encountered was in
recruitment of patients who had infarcts. During the allocated time period for the study the
ward which was the source of infarct participants had staffing problems which resulted in
potential participants not being screened and referred to the study. Once this became
apparent the recruitment procedure was altered to enable the researcher to approach some
infarct patients and an additional source was also considered via another hospital. It was not
possible to access patients from the other site as they were already being recruited for a
similar research project. Although the power of the study was reduced due to the small
sample size it has highlighted that post-stroke PTSD requires further investigation.
Furthermore, both brain injury and PTSD research often rely on small sample sizes and
single-case designs (see Bryant & Harvey, 1998; McNeil, 1996; Berry, 1998; Yule 1999).
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Including both haemorrhagic and infarct patients in the study meant that age had to be
controlled for. This appears to limit the extent to which findings can be generalised to the
general stroke population which tends to be older than participants in this study. However,
before being revised the DSM criterion A was based on the event having been 'outwith
usual human experience' and some still use this definition as a benchmark. Although stroke
is not a normal outcome of ageing it is associated with increasing age, if the study had
included all ages it could have been criticised as the event might not be considered to be
'outwith usual human experience' for that age cohort.
4:9:2 Design
The study was based entirely on self-report and interview data. This meant information
from those who had left-sided strokes was limited and any participants with limited insight
might have underestimated their mood disturbances. The reliance on interview data for
diagnosis meant only non-dysphasic patients representing specific left-sided strokes are
included and this has implications when interpreting data relating to site of lesion. Future
research would benefit from including dysphasic patients and this would be possible by
either adapting existing measures so that they do not rely as heavily on language, or by
interviewing relatives or other informants. The opportunity to gain collateral information
from relatives would also be beneficial in cases where participants might have reduced
insight. In Bryant & Harvey's (1995) study, the finding that a head-injured group reported
finding their incidents less traumatic, and that they believed they were less seriously injured
than the non-head injured group, is probably a reflection of reduced insight. In the current
study, the way in which two study participants described their stroke and their current
circumstances suggested to the researcher that they had reduced insight. This included a
participant who responded "no" indiscriminately and another who was laughing and
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giggling inappropriately. Interviewing a significant other would be helpful in distinguishing
reduced insight from an avoidant coping strategy.
4:9:3 Measures
The author is not aware of any studies which have used the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV with a stroke population, although it has been used with a head injured sample to
identify Axis 1 disorders (Hibbard et al 1998). The version based on DSM III-R has been
used with a stroke population by Sharpe et al, (1990) to diagnose anxiety and depression.
To comprehensively investigate psychological responses to stroke it will be necessary to
include participants with dysphasia. This could be achieved through use of
neuropsychological assessment to distinguish expressive and receptive dysphasia and adapt
information gathering modes accordingly or, to do as Sharpe et al (1990) did, and rely on
informants. Either approach will improve generalisability of future research findings.
Both Sembi et al (1998) and Berry (1998) used the Impact of Events scale, although as yet
there are no norms available for brain injured populations. The intrusion and avoidance sub-
scales of the IES were not found to correlate significantly in the participants of this study
who had PTSD. In general trauma research the scores would be expected to correlate,
nevertheless, the lack of correlation is consistent with the avoidance symptoms being more
frequently reported by this group than re-experiencing symptoms. When the PTSD and no
PTSD groups were compared there was no significant difference between them on
depression, total IES or intrusions score. This could reflect an insensitivity of the measure
but it could also be explained by high levels of pathology in those who were not diagnosed
with PTSD. The latter explanation is consistent with the increased numbers who would be
diagnosed with subsyndromal PTSD.
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Adaptation of measures could provide further help in distinguishing organic and
psychological symptoms. As McMillan, (2001) points out, some DSM symptoms will be
endorsed due to sequelae of the brain injury for example, in this study all of those with
PTSD and more than half of those not diagnosed reported concentration difficulties. Rather
than comparing brain injured with non brain injured on the symptoms reported, it would be
more useful to identify which symptoms distinguish brain injured with and without PTSD.
In this study, significant group differences were found in a number of symptoms and
establishing whether this is specific to stroke or is generalisable to traumatic brain injury
could provide indicators of PTSD which are independent of organic brain injury sequelae.
Furthermore, when assessing post-stroke PTSD it remains important to distinguish between
endorsements of particular symptoms e.g. diminished participation and interest, which could
be attributable to physical disability rather than PTSD.
4:9:4 Confounding variables
Although the issue of disability could be said to have been a confounding variable in this
study it could also be considered an important part of the traumatic experience. It may not
be possible, or appropriate to limit the definition of trauma to the stroke itself while not
considering the role of subsequent events. In general trauma research events post-trauma for
example, support received or security about the future, have been shown to be very
important in preventing chronic PTSD (Yule 1999; Paton & Smith 1998). Two of the
participants in this study described feeling more vulnerable since their stroke as their
reaction times were slower. Whether the sense of vulnerability is due to disability or fear of
the event recurring, the psychological impact is likely to be the same. Sembi et al (1998)
concluded in their study, that PTSD was independent of physical disability and that there
was no relationship between measures of disability and avoidance. It remains though that in
the present study an assessment of the impact of disability was not made and therefore the
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levels of anxiety and depression recorded could not be said to be independent of it. When
interviewing, the author attempted to distinguish symptoms and limitations which could be
attributed to disability from those which were attributable to trauma.
Post-stroke treatment could be considered a confounding variable when considering whether
data is representative of the entire stroke population. The experiences of haemorrhagic and
infarct strokes patients are different and exploring the impact of this was an important part
of the present study. Infarcts are most commonly treated medically, for example anti¬
coagulants or vasodilators, which will increase the blood flow through the obstructed vessel.
Although surgical intervention to clear an obstructed artery is an option, it is usually an
elective procedure. In contrast, the intervention for haemorrhage is surgical and is therefore
more invasive. Following a haemorrhage, the individual is usually admitted to an intensive
care unit to stabilise their condition prior to surgical intervention aimed at reducing the
chance of another bleed. The surgery normally involves having a metal clip or coil inserted
in the artery to prevent it ballooning out. It could therefore be argued that the patients who
have haemorrhages are more likely to develop traumatic symptoms, (despite being more
likely to lose consciousness) because of not only the symptoms associated with the bleed,
but also the subsequent treatment for it. This study did find higher prevalence of PTSD in
the haemorrhagic sample and as such highlights an area for further research.
The estimated prevalence of PTSD in this sample might be lower than would be found if
participants had been interviewed closer to the event. DSM IV diagnosis requires that
symptoms must be present for at least one month post event to be classified as PTSD.
However, the mean time since injury was more than one year which means some cases of
PTSD will have resolved as it is usual to expect some remission of symptoms over time
(Solomon et al, 1992). Comments made by some participants would be consistent with the
conclusion that closer to the event prevalence might have been higher. One participant
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stated that he had experienced feelings of dissociation although this was no longer occurred
and another participant said she had experienced nightmares although they had stopped at
the time of the interview. Despite this however, Yule (1999) reported that the numbers
which will remit without intervention are relatively small. This suggests that although the
prevalence rate reported here might only reflect those participants with chronic PTSD, the
acute levels of PTSD are not likely to be much higher.
4:10 Recommendations For Future Research
There has been little research in the area of PTSD post-stroke and this study has highlighted
a number of areas that would benefit from further investigation. As discussed previously it
would be informative to include participants with dysphasia as this would provide an
accurate prevalence rate as well as contributing information about the significance of lesion
location and PTSD. It would also be useful to explore the content of intrusions reported by
this population. In particular, it would be useful to identify what the group who had no
recall of the event were re-experiencing. Our understanding of the longitudinal course of
PTSD post-stroke is limited and it would be helpful to establish whether acute stress
disorder has the same power to predict PTSD in a stroke population as it was recently found
to have in a non brain injured sample (Brewin et al, 1999). This type of design might also
help to overcome one of the difficulties associated with all PTSD research which is that the
most distressed will often decide not to participate in studies. It is not unusual for PTSD
patients to be ambivalent about treatment (Yule 1999). Although the symptoms are
significantly distressing, the suggestion of treatment or participation in a study which
involves thinking and talking about the event they try to avoid, is too difficult. At least two
individuals contacted for this study who declined to participate made spontaneous comments
relating to the fact that they preferred not to discuss what had happened and would rather
put it out of their minds.
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It would also be useful to identify the factors which predispose some individuals to develop
PTSD after stroke and to consider whether these are the same as in non brain injured groups.
There are a number of factors which could have important roles in precipitating and
maintaining post-stroke PTSD including premorbid psychopathology, appraisal of the event
and social supports available post-stroke. Another area which would benefit from further
investigation is that of vicarious traumatisation, especially as comments made by some
participants suggested that although they had not been traumatised by the event, their close
family members might have been.
4:11 Conclusion
This study can conclude that for some individuals the experience of having a stroke can
precipitate a post-traumatic stress reaction. It provides more evidence that brain injury and
PTSD are not mutually exclusive conditions. It also highlights a number of implications for
clinicians working with stroke patients. Until recently psychological interventions after
brain injury have tended to concentrate on neuropsychological assessment and
rehabilitation. However, if PTSD is not recognised it is likely to have a detrimental effect
on rehabilitation and functional improvement as well as psychological health. Davidson,
Hughes, Blazer & George (1991) reported that PTSD patients were fifteen times more likely
to attempt suicide than non-PTSD patients. In a sample of participants who had stroke,
Sembi et al (1998) found that those diagnosed with PTSD group had higher levels of
suicidal ideation than those without PTSD.
It is also likely that PTSD will have on detrimental effect on post-stroke rehabilitation.
Post-stroke cognitive deficits, for example reduced motivation, concentration impairments,
sleep disturbance will all be exacerbated with co-morbid PTSD (Bryant et al, 2001).
Furthermore individuals post-stroke are already functioning with reduced cognitive capacity
and any other demands on their reduced cognitive resources e.g. intrusive thoughts, are
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likely to inhibit the efficacy of rehabilitation. In this study, levels of avoidance were found
to be high, this could mean that patients are at best, unwilling to attend rehabilitation
hospitals and at worst, that attending actually contributes to their distress. For individuals
with PTSD, it is often crucial in therapy for them to have some sense of control and power
over their situation. Post-stroke the individual's world has been "shattered" and they may
not be given an opportunity to process this event as they are immediately, (albeit
necessarily) immersed in the process of physical rehabilitation. A lack of both power and
control are reinforced by this process. Attempts to establish a sense of predictability or
certainty are impossible when no one can tell you how much recovery you are likely to
make, whether you will have another stroke or why it happened in the first place.
Avoidance is not a strategy that could easily be adopted as the individual is constantly faced
with reminders of the event as well as being in a ward with others who are either more
severely or less severely affected than them. They are constantly exposed to reminders of
what they have lost or how "lucky" they have been not to be more disabled. These issues
mean that identifying and providing interventions for post-stroke traumatic reactions could
be beneficial not only in terms of the psychological health of patients, but also on the
progress they make during rehabilitation.
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APPENDIX 1
DSM IV Criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Diagnosis.
Criterion A. The individual was exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following
were present:
• the person experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events
which involved actual or threatened injury to the physical integrity of themselves
or others
• their response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror
Criterion B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the
following ways:
• recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images,
thoughts, or perceptions
• recurrent distressing dreams of the event
• acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of
reliving their experience, illusions, hallucinations and dissociative flashback
episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated.
• intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event
• physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolise or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
Criterion C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of
general responsiveness. As indicated by three(or more)of the following:
• efforts to avoid thoughts feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma
• efforts to avoid activities, places or people that arouse recollections of the trauma
• inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
• markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
• feelings of detachment or estrangement from others
• restricted range of affect
• sense of foreshortened future.
Criterion D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal as indicated by two or more of the
following:
• difficulty falling or staying asleep
• irritability or outbursts of anger
• difficulty concentrating
• hypervigilance
• exaggerated startle response.
Criterion E. Duration of the disturbance is more than one month.
Criterion F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Specify if:
Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than three months
Chronic: if duration is three months or more
Specify if:
With Delayed Onset: if onset of symptoms is at least six months after the stressor.
APPENDIX 2
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS AFTER STROKE : PATIENT INFORMATION
SHEET
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with friends, relatives and your GP
if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or ifyou would like more
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.
Thank you for reading this.
What is the purpose of the study?
This study will run between January and June 2001 and intends to examine some of the
emotional consequences of having a stroke.
Why have I been chosen?
Approximately sixty patients who have had either a stroke or a haemorrhage have been
asked to take part in this study.
Do I have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be
given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to
take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without having to give a reason. This will
not affect the standard of care you receive.
What will happen to me if I take part?
Ifyou decide to take part in this study you will be interviewed by a researcher. This will be
single session and would last no longer than 90 minutes. This will take place at an out¬
patient clinic or, if you do not regularly attend the hospital, a researcher could visit you at
home.
What do I have to do?
You will be asked to complete two questionnaires. During the interview you will also be
asked questions about how you have felt since your stroke or haemorrhage.
What are the possible benefits / disadvantages of taking part?
The information we get from this study may help us to treat future patients who become
psychologically distressed after strokes.
The researcher will also ask you before you begin whether or not you would like feedback
on the outcome of the interview.
A disadvantage to taking part could be that talking about your stroke and how you have felt
since may be upsetting for you. However, if you are experiencing psychological distress,
and you would like advice about accessing appropriate services, the researcher will be able
to help with this.
SDS0210M
Will I get any feedback?
If you would like feedback on the outcome of the project you should ask the researcher and
this could be sent out to you once the study is completed. The feedback will however just
be general and would not be specifically about you.
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept
strictly confidential. Any information about you will have your name and address removed
so that you cannot be recognised from it.
What will happen to the results of the research study?
This study is part of the degree ofDoctor of Clinical Psychology with the University of
Edinburgh. As a result it will be written up and submitted for examination. The study may
also be published in a journal. If it were to be published, this would occur within twelve
months of the study being completed and you would be able to access a copy of the
completed article through the National Library.
Contact for Further Information
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this study. If you require any







You will be contacted by telephone to ask if you wish to take part in this project.
You may also wish to contact the Independent Advisor for this project if you would like to






This Patient Information Sheet (version 2) is yours to keep. Ifyou agree to participateyou
will be asked to complete a consentform, a copy ofwhich will also be given to you.
4 January, 2001
SDS0210M











Whatisyourname'(2) Wheredoy uliv ?(4)
2Wherearyounow'(5)city (unnecessarytostaten mfhospit l) 3Onwhatdateereyouadmittedt shospital?(5) Howdidyougethere'(5)
Whenw reyouborn?(4)
(5)hospital
Whatist efirev ntyoucrem mberafterthinjury?(5).







Canyoudescribeietail( .g.,dattime,co panions)hfi stev ntyouaecallft rinjury?5) Canyoudescribethel stev ntyourecallbef retaccid n ?(5) thefirstev ntyoucarecallb f retheinjury?(5). Whattimeistnow?Canyoudescribeintail( .g.,te.timco panions)
6.Whattimeistnow?(1f re ch%h urremovedrcorrecttimaximumf5)
7Whatdayoft ewe kis'(1f re chd yremovedrcorrecton ) 8.Whatdayoft emon hisit?(1f re chd yr movedrcorrecttmaximum5) 9.Whatist emonth?.(5f re chonthr movedfroc rrectaximumf15) 10.Whatiseye r' .(10foreachyearremovedrcorrectntmaximumf30)
TotalErrorP ints







You experienced (life event):
Below is a list of comments made by people after stressful life events. Please check each item,
indicating how frequently these comments were true for you during the past seven days.
If they did not occur during that time, please mark the "not at all" column.
Frequency
1. I thought about it when I didn't mean to
2. I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about
it or was reminded of it
3. I tried to remove it from memory
4. I had trouble falling asleep or staying asleep, because of
the pictures or thoughts about it that came into my mind
5. I had waves of strong feelings about it
6. I had dreams about it
7. I stayed away from reminders of it
8. I felt as if it hadn't happened or it wasn't real
9. I tried not to talk about it
«•
10. Pictures about it popped into my mind
11. Other things kept making me think about it
12. I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it,
but I didn't deal with them
13. I tried not to think about it
14. Any reminder brought back feelings about it
15. My feelings about it were kind of numb
Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often
This measure is part of Measures in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Practitioner's Guide by Stuart Turner
and Deborah Lee. Once the invoice has been paid, it may be photocopied for use within the purchasing
institution only. Published by The NFER-NELSON Publishing Company Ltd, Darville House,
2 Oxford Road East, Windsor, Berkshire SL4 1DF, UK. Code 4930004
NFER-NELSON
Health tS Social Cure
APPENDIX 5
F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet
E. Not due to a substance or a general medical condition (check p. 60)
WARNING: A "YES" answer to the interview question equals a rating
Notes:
Check here if criteria have been met in the past month.
S~] OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER CRITERIA A, B, C, D,—J AND E ARE "+"















Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
ijClD-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 53
Ratings: ? = inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
54 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet





|F46| (5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues
Notes:
? - + F46





C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing
of general responsiveness, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:
F48 | (1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations
Notes:
? - + F48
F49 | (2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections
of the trauma
Notes:
? - + F49
F50 (3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
Notes:
+1 F50
Ratings: ? = inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
ID-CV Scoresheet F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS 55
HI (4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
Notes:
? - + F51
52 (5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
Notes:
? - + | F52
53 (6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)
Notes:
? - + | F53
54 (7) sense of a foreshortened future
Notes:
?, - + F54





D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal as indicated by two (or more)
of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep ? - + F56
57
5T
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger ? - + F57
(3) difficulty concentrating ? - + | F58
59_ (4) hypervigilance ? - + | F59
JKT
6T
(5) exaggerated startle response ? - + F60




Ratings: ? = Inadequate information; - = Absent (or subthreshold); + = Present
56 F. ANXIETY/OTHER DISORDERS SCID-CV Scoresheet









lF64l POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER CRITERIA A, B, C, D, E,
AND F ARE









F65 300.22 Agoraphobia Without History of Panic Disorder
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F65
F66 300.23 Social Phobia
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F66
1 F67 1 300.29 Specific Phobia
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F67
F68 300.02 Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Check here if present in the past month.
? - + F68




Patient Identification Number for this trial:
CONSENT FORM









1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 04/01/01
(version 2) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. □
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at
any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being
affected. □
3. I understand that sections of any of my medical notes may be looked at by the
researcher, I give permission for this individual to have access to my records.
□
4. I agree to take part in the above study. □
5. I give permission for my GP to be notified of my participation in this study □
Name of Patient Date Signature
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature
(if different from researcher)
Researcher Date Signature









Bl=Intrusivethoughts B2=Nightmares B3=Recurring B4=Distressatreminder B5=Arousalatreminders
Cl=Avoidthoughts C2=Avoidactivities C3=an'trememberparofev n C4=Diminishedinterest C5=Detached
C6=Affect C7=Future
Dl=Sleepdisturbance D2=Anger D3=Concentration D4=Hypervigilant D5=HeightenedStartl
